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Abstract
Using new survey and experimental data for a representative sample of the German
population, we study preferences for tax simplification. The general wisdom seems
to suggest that most tax systems are overly complex and that tax simplification is
generally desirable. Consistent with this general wisdom, we find that more than
90% of our sample believe that the tax system needs to be simplified. However,
there also are efficiency and equity arguments in support of a certain degree of tax
complexity and it is puzzling why tax systems remain highly complex despite the
conventional view in favor of more simplification. The main purpose of our study
then is to investigate if the high support for tax simplification is driven by a lack of
awareness about the trade-offs behind simple and complex tax systems. Our data
show that the support for simplification decreases as we randomly provide economic
arguments against simplification and as we ask respondents if the tax system should
account for specific differences in living situations (such as costly care of elderly
family members). Overall, our findings suggest that the high support for simpler
taxes is to some extent driven by a lack of awareness about the implications of tax
simplification.
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1 Introduction
Should tax systems be simplified? The conventional wisdom seems to be: yes, tax systems
should be simpler! As the literature shows, there are indeed many good reasons for sup-
porting tax simplification. For example, recent studies show that the self-employed value
tax simplicity and leave money on the table because of complex tax schedules (Aghion
et al. 2017; Benzarti 2017), that taxpayers underreact to complex tax incentives (Abeler
and Jaeger 2014), that the existence of complexity-adding tax expenditures facilitates
tax evasion (Kleven et al. 2011; Paetzold and Winner 2016), and that tax complexity
reduces the take up of tax refunds by firms (Zwick 2018). Complex tax systems also lend
scope to lobby groups to achieve beneficial tax treatment for the groups they represent
(Brusco et al. 2014), have negative effects on income inequality (Aghion et al. 2017), and
possibly come with substantial resource costs (Pitt and Slemrod 1989). It is therefore
maybe not surprising that many economists propose implementing tax reforms that make
the system less complex, for example through lower rates and broader bases.1 Not only
many economists and academics support a simpler tax system; the conventional wisdom
among policy makers and journalists also seems to hold that simplifying tax systems is
generally desirable.2
However, despite many arguments in favor of tax simplicity, there are also economic
arguments in support of a certain degree of tax complexity (see, e.g., OECD 2010b, Hines
2016, and Hines 2019). For example, a fairly complex tax system with a certain amount
of tax expenditures i) makes it possible to tailor taxes to individual situations and to
use ’tagging’ components,3 ii) allows to tax highly elastic goods at effectively lower rates,
iii) avoids tax compounding (e.g., favorable tax treatment of pensions and retirement
savings), and iv) enables to include Pigouivian elements into the tax system that correct
for market failures or internalize negative externalities, e.g. research tax credits (Hines
2016; Hines 2019). These elements of a complex tax system can contribute to making
the tax system more efficient. Complex components of the tax system potentially also
have redistributive purposes – think for example of deducting the costs of elderly care of
family members or allowances for dependent children – and might therefore be viewed as
1The simplification of the tax system is a key objective of many income-tax reform proposals by
economists in various countries. For example, Gale (2001), Rohaly and Gale (2004) and Gravelle and
Hungerford (2012) for the US, James et al. (1997) for Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
Tran-Nam (2000) for Australia, and Fuest et al. (2008) and Wagner (2006) for Germany.
2See newspaper coverage for the US showing that many politicians and journalists make a case for
a simplified tax system: e.g., Economist (2005), Economist (2013), NYT (2015), NPR (2015), Forbes
(2017), as well as Vox (2017).
3Tagging is for example studied in Cremer et al. (2010). Gordon and Kopczuk (2014) study the
selection of the income tax base and show that it is advantageous (in the sense of approximating a tax on
ability as good as possible) to allow for particular tax expenditures (such as the dependents’ deduction).
Thus, there is an implicit rationale for not having the simplest possible tax system with a broad base
and without any tax expenditures.
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equity enhancing and fair.4
The arguments in support of tax complexity do not feature prominently in the de-
bate about tax complexity. The general-wisdom support of simple tax systems might
therefore miss out some of the efficiency and redistribution aspects of tax simplification.
In addition, the data show that most tax systems remain very complex and are character-
ized by the presence of a large amount of tax expenditures (e.g., OECD 2010b). Figure 1
shows for the US that there is an upward sloping trend in the growth of tax expenditures,
suggesting that the tax system tends to get even more complex over time. It is thus a
puzzle why most tax systems remain so complex although the general wisdom seems to
hold that substantial tax simplification is desirable.
Considering important arguments both in favor and against simplification, and in
light of lasting complexity of real-world tax systems, attitudes towards tax simplification
among the public may be more nuanced than they seem on first glance. In this paper,
we aim to shed light on the debate about tax complexity and collect new survey and
experimental data to study preferences for tax simplicity among a representative sample
of the German population.5
Our paper has two main objectives: First, we document preferences for tax simplic-
ity and report which fraction of the population supports a simplified tax system. This first
part of the paper particularly investigates if public support for tax simplicity is indeed
consistent with the conventional wisdom and consensus that apparently exist in academic
and public-press debates. Second, we investigate if preferences for tax simplification are
driven by a lack of awareness about the implications and consequences of tax simplifica-
tion. In other words: Is the general wisdom regarding tax simplicity driven by awareness
and information deficits? Do individuals frequently express desires for tax simplification
without appreciating the implications of tax simplification? To address these questions,
we i) elicit if people are in favor of specific tax expenditures which add complexity to the
tax system, and we ii) implement two randomized experiments to study if preferences for
tax simplicity are elastic to information in favor and against tax simplification. That is,
we study if preferences are shifted once people are made aware of the trade-offs behind
complexity and simplicity.
The working hypothesis throughout our paper is that preferences for tax simpli-
fication are possibly shifted once individuals are explicitly forced to think about their
simplicity preferences in concrete applications or if they are made aware of information
4The role of economic theory in this discussion is addressed by Hines (2016) who concludes that:
”Economic theory does not say that an efficient and equitable income tax system has a broad base and
a low rate, and in fact the theory has never said that.” (Abstract).
5Germany has a considerably complex tax system with many tax expenditures. In addition, the
simplification of the tax system is a frequently debated issue in the media and among politicians. The
case of Germany might therefore be a well suited case to study preferences for tax complexity. See
Section 2.2 for more details on tax complexity in Germany.
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and aspects of tax complexity that are new to them. Presumably, such a shift in pref-
erences is greater in response to information against tax simplicity than to information
in favor of simplicity, because pro-simplicity arguments play a more prominent role in
the public debate and misperceptions are thus likely to be less prevailing with regard to
pro-simplicity arguments.
We included a set of questions in the context of tax simplification into the German
Internet Panel, a representative survey of the German population (N = 2464). The sur-
vey questions are tailor-made and designed to speak to the two objectives of our paper.
The concept of tax complexity is complex in itself, and for the purpose of the survey
we decided to focus on one particular dimension of tax complexity: the number of tax
expenditures.6 While there are clearly more dimensions of tax complexity (e.g., doc-
umentation requirements, etc.), tax expenditures are a main source of tax complexity
and a major issue in the debate about complexity; moving to a system without any tax
expenditures would clearly make any existing tax system simpler, easier and more com-
prehensible. This definition of tax complexity is consistent with Slemrod and Kopczuk
(2002) and Kopczuk (2005) who characterize an income tax system as complex when it
features many deductions (also see the discussion about tax-complexity measurement in
Abeler and Jaeger 2014). We further focus on the case of the personal income tax (PIT)
which appears to be the natural choice for a survey on tax attitudes among the general
public.
Our survey reveals the following main results. First, more than 90% of the partici-
pants have a preference for tax simplification. We survey this question on a scale from 1
to 6, where 6 means strong support for tax simplification, and find an average of 5.2. This
result confirms that the prevailing view indeed holds that tax simplification is desirable.
Apparently, supporting tax simplification seems to be the obvious choice and general-
wisdom reply for the large majority of respondents. This finding is the starting point
of our analysis, in which we aim to investigate if the high support for tax simplification
persists as we make people aware of the trade-offs between tax simplicity and complexity.
In other words, we move on from the finding that tax simplification is the obvious choice
in the survey and study if the matter becomes less obvious as we highlight the trade-offs
behind this choice.7
Second, we then dig deeper into preferences for tax simplicity and study if the large
support for simplicity holds as we ask for the preferred tax system in particular contexts.
For this purpose, we have a series of questions in which we present participants with
6A straight forward definition of tax expenditures is provided by the Tax Policy Center (2019): ’Tax
expenditures are special provisions of the tax code such as exclusions, deductions, deferrals, credits, and
tax rates that benefit specific activities or groups of taxpayers.’
7An analysis of the anatomy of simplification preferences shows that age, gender and the perceived
difficulty of filing a tax return are the strongest correlates of simplification preferences.
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the living situations of two fictitious taxpayers,8 and then survey if these two taxpayers
should pay the same amount of taxes or if any of the two should pay less in taxes than
the other person. We designed the questions in a way where the two fictitious persons are
similar in all tax-relevant means except for one particular aspect of their living situation.
In particular, the two fictitious taxpayers were different with respect to i) the necessity
to spend money on the elderly care of a family member, ii) the amount they donate for
charity, and iii) the distance between their home and work place.
The results show that in all three scenarios – i) to iii) – a considerable fraction
of respondents indicate that the two persons should not pay the same amount of taxes
and that the taxpayer with the additional cost burden should pay less. In particular,
more than 60% of respondents think that the tax system should account for elderly-care
costs. In the case of the other two scenarios, roughly 40% and 30%, respectively, believe
that the tax system should account for the respective difference between the taxpayers.9
Importantly, the share of people who indicate that the tax system should not account for
certain differences in living situation (and thus be as simple as possible) is in all three
scenarios considerably smaller than the 90%-share of people who generally support to
have a simpler tax system.
These results are thus evidence that many people prefer a tax system which allows
for a differential tax treatment of taxpayers in different living situations. Obviously, such
a differential treatment of two otherwise identical taxpayers can only be achieved through
tax expenditures, and thus through a substantial degree of tax complexity. The survey
respondents might not even realize that their choices imply tax complexity. However, the
exercise provides evidence that people implicitly have preferences for a tax system that
is more complex than a system without any tax expenditures. As we force participants
to think about specific complexity-adding expenditures, many indicate that they wish a
tax system that differentiates between taxpayers in different situations.
We are able to show that the answers to these questions are not solely driven by self
interest; the result picture remains as we condition on not benefiting personally from the
respective tax expenditure. Our findings thus show that preferences for having certain
tax expenditures in the tax system are not (only) driven by the desire to keep those tax
expenditures from which someone benefits personally. In other words, preferences for a
certain degree of complexity are beyond pure payoff-maximizing considerations.
8This survey question technique is similar to some of the survey question types used by Weinzierl
(2014), Saez and Stantcheva (2016) and Weinzierl (2017). These studies are not in the context of tax
complexity though.
9The observation that the ’elderly care’ scenario induces more participants to vote for differential
taxation than the other two scenarios is interesting in light of the fact that the costs for elderly care
are circumstantial (outside control of taxpayers) while the other two are choices. Our respondents thus
exhibit preferences that are consistent with arguments in the literature strands of optimal taxation and
equality opportunity according to which circumstantial differences should be accounted for in the tax
system while choices should not.
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Third, we implement two randomized survey experiments to study the causal effect
of information about the implications and consequences of tax simplification on prefer-
ences for tax simplification. These experiments are directly linked to our previous results,
according to which a large majority indicate that they support tax simplification, but, at
the same time, a large fraction of respondents prefer to account for the living situation
of taxpayers through the tax system. The randomized experiments shed light on this
puzzle and investigate if preferences for tax simplicity are elastic to information about
the implications of tax simplicity. Eventually, the experiments have the objective of un-
derstanding if the high support for tax complexity is partly driven by a lack of awareness
regarding what it possibly means to simplify taxes (i.e., the trade-off between arguments
pro and con simplification).
To maximize power, we have one experimental intervention at the beginning of the
survey and one experimental intervention towards the end. In each of the two exper-
iments, we have a neutral control group, one group in which preferences are possibly
shifted towards stronger support for tax simplification, and one group in which prefer-
ences are possibly shifted towards less support for tax simplification. This set up thus
allows us to study if preferences for tax simplicity are elastic at all, and if yes, if they are
elastic in both directions (the experimental groups are described in more detail in Section
3). The information and arguments that we use to shift preferences in the four treatment
groups are inspired by some of the most debated issues in the context of tax complexity
(see beginning of this Introduction): i) redistribution and social-policy aspects, ii) tax
avoidance and evasion, iii) efficiency and iv) lobbyism and special-interest groups.
The first experiment includes three randomly assigned groups. A control group
which is exposed to a neutral statement about the fact that there is an ongoing debate
about whether the tax system is too complex because of various tax expenditures. The
second group, labeled Redistribution group, is exposed to a statement highlighting that
tax deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden for taxpayers which are disad-
vantaged by exogenous circumstances. A third experimental group, labeled Avoidance
group, is exposed to an argument in favor of tax simplification, namely that a complex
system with many deductions offers possibilities to avoid taxes and manipulate taxable
income.10
The Redistribution-treatment significantly reduces the general support of tax sim-
plification relative to the control group. This is evidence that preferences for tax sim-
plicity are elastic to information about the potentially undesirable implications of tax
simplicity. The Avoidance-treatment did not have any significant effects; coefficients
10Respondents in all three experimental groups see the neutral statement. Respondents in the two
treatment groups are thus exposed to the respective treatment in addition to the neutral statement,
while control-group participants only see the neutral statement. The neutral statement in the control
group serves the purpose of making the topic itself equally salient to respondents in all groups.
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are much smaller than the effects of treatment Redistribution and the standard errors
are larger than the coefficients. This null-result is potentially explained by the more
prominent role of arguments in favor of simplification in the public debate, and thus less
misperceptions regarding arguments that support more simplification. However, while
the Avoidance treatment did not affect preferences for tax simplicity, it did affect how
people think about the distributional aspects of tax complexity: it increased agreement
with the statement that tax expenditures benefit the rich more.
The second experiment also includes three groups. We again have a control group
with a neutral statement. We then have a group in which we highlight that a system with
deductions and exemptions provides better opportunities to tax individual capacities and
ability; we label this group the Efficiency group. Participants in the third group, labeled
Special Interest Group, are made aware that tax expenditures are potentially used by
lobby and special interest groups to bargain tax exemptions for their clientele.11
The results of this second experiment show that the Efficiency argument signif-
icantly lowers the support for tax simplification, relative to the control group. This
suggests that participants are not aware of the potential efficiency implications of tax
complexity and confirms the finding of the first experiment that preferences for simpler
taxes are elastic to information against simplification. The Special Interest Group treat-
ment did not have an effect, relative to the control group. This is also consistent with
the findings of the first experiment; arguments in favor of more simplicity do not have an
effect on preferences for simplification. For both experiments, we observe that treatment
effects are homogenous across different demographic groups.12
Fourth, we aimed at eliciting which type of simplifying tax reforms respondents
prefer. We offered a choice of different reform approaches towards simplification and
asked respondents to decide which ones they prefer (under the assumption that each of
the offered approaches is revenue neutral). The most preferred reform (chosen by about
1/3 of the respondents) entails an increase in the degree of progressivity, but eliminates all
deductions and tax expenditures. Overall, however, we observe that there is no consensus
among respondents w.r.t. the type of tax-simplifying tax reform. These preferred policy
choices are also not affected by the first experimental treatment.13
Contribution. We identify the following main contributions of our paper and its
empirical findings (see section 2.1 for an overview of the literature to which we con-
11As in the first experiment, respondents in all three experimental groups are exposed to the neutral
statement.
12The experimental intervention also did not have an effect on the previously mentioned questions
regarding the tax burdens of two similar taxpayers that differ w.r.t. one particular dimension.
13The question was asked before the second experiment, implying that we cannot test the effect of the
second experiment on policy choices. The statistical inference of both experiments’ results are robust to
standard errors that are adjusted to multiple hypothesis testing and exact significance tests (see results
section 4).
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tribute). First, we implement the first nuanced survey in the context of tax complexity
and integrate our questions into an established representative survey. The survey design
itself therefore stands as a contribution. To this end, we add to a recent literature using
tailor-made surveys to study specific research topics. Second, we document in a represen-
tative sample of the population that a large majority of individuals has strong preferences
for tax simplification. These preferences in support of tax simplification are consistent
with the large literature showing that complexity is costly. Third, we study if the large
support for tax simplification depends on the extent of awareness about the consequences
and implications of tax simplification. In particular, we show that the support for sim-
plification weakens as respondents are confronted with scenarios and information which
present potential arguments in support of a certain degree of complexity. This shows that
preferences for simplification are elastic to information and context, and suggests that
the debate about complexity could potentially benefit from a more nuanced discussion
of the pros and cons of complexity. Fourth, we speak to the puzzle that tax complexity
keeps increasing despite the largely prevailing view that tax systems should be simpli-
fied. In addition, we document that a large fraction of people would prefer a type of
tax-simplifying reform that maintains the degree of redistribution/progressivity or even
increases it. These two latter points relate to the literature on the political economy of
taxes and tax complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related
literature (2.1), elaborates on the German case of tax complexity (2.2), and derives the
paper’s working hypotheses (2.3). Section 3 provides an overview of the survey (incl. the
randomized components) and its implementation. Section 4 presents the survey results.
We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Related Literature and Tax Complexity in Ger-
many
2.1 Related Literature
We relate to the following strands of literature. First, we speak to the literature on the
consequences of tax complexity. Several papers show that tax complexity comes with
resource costs and foregone money for firms and individuals (e.g., Pitt and Slemrod 1989,
Aghion et al. 2017, Benzarti 2017, Zwick 2018). In addition, tax complexity has been
shown to affect inequality (Aghion et al. 2017), and it facilitates lobbying for beneficial
tax treatment by special-interest groups (Brusco et al. 2014) as well as tax evasion
(Kleven et al. 2011; Paetzold and Winner 2016; Tsankova et al. 2019). Kopczuk (2012)
shows that the introduction of a flat-tax reform with lower rates and less tax expenditures
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increases tax revenues.14
Second, we contribute to a related strand of literature showing that the complexity
of taxes and other policy-measures distorts the responses to these government interven-
tions and reduces their take-up. For example, Abeler and Jaeger (2014) study the causal
effect of tax complexity on tax responses in a lab-experimental situation, and find that
people underreact to complex tax incentives. Saez (2010), along with the survey evi-
dence of Fujii and Hawley (1988), suggests that individuals do not respond optimally
to the incentives of the EITC. The complex structure of the EITC also seems to drive
its low take-up (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches 2007; Chetty and Saez 2013; Bhargava and
Manoli 2015). Blaufus and Ortlieb (2009) show that complexity systematically distorts
the decision to invest in retirement plans. A further set of papers shows that people sys-
tematically misperceive tax incentives – presumably due to tax complexity (de Bartolome
1995; Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004; Blumkin et al. 2012; Blaufus et al. 2013; Ito 2014;
Feldman et al. 2016; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky 2016; Gideon 2017; Ballard et al. 2018).
Furthermore, a simplified filing of the tax return affects filing and compliance behavior
(Kotakorpi and Laamanen 2016; Fochmann et al. 2018). Tax complexity is also likely to
be related to the established finding that tax salience is relevant for tax responses (Chetty
et al. 2009; Finkelstein 2009; Goldin and Homonoff 2013; Feldman and Ruffle 2015). Tax
responses also depend on the existence of complexity-adding deductions (Neisser 2017;
Doerrenberg et al. 2017; Paetzold 2019).15
Third, we relate to (rarely made) arguments that highlight some potential upsides
of tax complexity and express a rationale for the implementation of tax expenditures.
James Hines discusses why it is not necessarily desirable to have the simplest tax system
with a broad base and low rates (Hines 2016; Hines 2019). He particularly focuses on tax
expenditures and provides efficiency and equity arguments for why it is costly to reduce
or eliminate tax expenditures (see points i) to iv) above on potential arguments in favor
of some degree of complexity). He also discusses several potential justifications to have a
comprehensive and simple system with a broad base and low rates, and elaborates that
many of these justifications for simplicity do not withstand economic reasoning. OECD
(2010a) also discuss the rationale for implementing tax expenditures. They particularly
point out arguments of i) tax administration costs (costs of broadening the base might
exceed the corresponding efficiency gains), ii) equity and social-policy considerations (tax
provisions might have the same purposes as social benefits), iii) correcting of market
failures (internalize positive external effects), and iv) a political-economy argument, that
they borrow from Hettich and Winer (1999), according to which the elimination of tax
expenditures possibly reduces tax revenues (abolishing tax expenditures implies that
14See the first paragraph of the Introduction for more context for some of these papers.
15Somewhat related also is the finding by Brown et al. (2017) that complexity complicates the ability
of consumers to value life annuities (such as social security benefits).
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government will be less able to discriminate among heterogeneous taxpayers and voters,
which will lead to an increased overall opposition to taxation). Given that the existence
of tax expenditures adds complexity to the tax system, Hines (2016), Hines (2019) and
OECD (2010a) thus provide arguments for keeping a certain degree of complexity and not
move to the simplest possible system. As discussed in footnote 3, Gordon and Kopczuk
(2014) also provide a rationale for not having the simplest possible tax system.
Fourth, we touch upon a literature on the political economy of taxes and tax reforms
(e.g., Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Bierbrauer et al. 2018;
Bierbrauer and Boyer 2018). We point to an apparent puzzle that tax complexity remains
high in the real-world despite the seemingly wide support for tax simplification. To this
end, we for example relate to Hettich and Winer (1988) who model the existing tax
system with several expenditures as the result of a political process and a government
that maximizes political support. A few papers explicitly study tax complexity in a
political-economy set-up and investigate how tax complexity arises in the interaction
between voters and politicians (Warskett et al. 1998; Galli and Profeta 2009). Our paper
speaks to these papers as it suggests that arguments against tax simplicity could play
a more prominent role in the voting process if voters were more aware of the trade-offs
behind tax complexity and simplicity. To the extent that our paper shows that individuals
have misleading information regarding taxes, we also relate to literature showing that
such information frictions induces the government to implement inefficient tax policy
(Boccanfuso and Ferey 2019).
Fifth, we join a set of papers that set up tailor-made surveys with randomized
components to study a particular research topic. Topics that were investigated in such
tailor-made surveys include preferences for redistribution (Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko
et al. 2015; Alesina et al. 2018; Roth and Wohlfart 2018), beliefs about behavioral
responses to taxes (Cappelen et al. 2018), immigration (Alesina et al. 2018), social pref-
erences (Kerschbamer and Mu¨ller 2017), inheritance taxation (Bastani and Waldenstroem
2019), reforms in the Euro area (Dolls and Wehrhoefer 2018), tax-compliance attitudes
(Doerrenberg and Peichl 2018), education (Lergetporer et al. 2018; Lergetporer et al.
2018), road mileage user fees (Duncan et al. 2014), and macro-economic expectations
(Roth and Wohlfart 2019). As we do, the randomized components in these surveys show
that information can have an effect on attitudes and preferences. Several of these studies
rely on commercial providers who conduct the surveys online and establish representa-
tivity through a reweighting of the initially non-representative sample. We implement
our questions within the GIP, an established survey with a representative sample of the
German population that was explicitly build up for research purposes.
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2.2 Tax Complexity in Germany
Our survey is conducted in a country with a fairly complex income-tax system. For
example, Germany’s tax schedule presumably includes more than 500 deduction possi-
bilities, according to Kirchhof (2011). A study by Blaufus et al. (2014) finds that the
large number of tax expenditures along with other particularities of the German tax sys-
tem translate into considerable income-tax compliance costs of filing taxes. Using survey
data, the study estimates aggregate compliance costs for Germany of 6-9 billion EUR,
corresponding to 3.1-4.7% of total 2007 tax revenues. Blaufus et al. (2017) show that
expenses for a professional tax preparer are smaller than the savings in tax liability that
are due to the tax preparer. In other words, it pays off to have a professional tax pre-
parer. This is a further indication that the system is complex; in a world with the easiest
possible tax system it would most likely not pay off to have the tax return filed by a
professional. Overall, studying the topic of tax complexity in the context of Germany
thus appears a sensible choice given its complex income tax system. In light of the large
number of tax expenditures, studying complexity through its dimension of the number
of tax expenditures is also reasonable.
A further reason for why Germany is an interesting case to study complexity is that
there are frequently returning debates about tax simplification in the public, media and
among politicians. One prominent example of this debate is the proposal by prominent
politicians (particularly in the conservative center-right party) to simplify the tax system
in a way that makes it possible to file the income-tax return on a sheet of paper that is
not larger than a usual German beer coaster (such proposals were originally made in 2003
and kept coming back ever since; see FAZ 2004 or Goettinger Tageblatt 2018). Another
salient example is the proposal of a prominent academic tax lawyer (Paul Kirchhof)
during election campaigns to introduce an income-tax system with a flat rate of 25% and
considerably less tax expenditures (see e.g., FAZ 2005).
2.3 Main Objectives and Hypotheses
As sketched in the Introduction, our paper has two main objectives. Based on the related
literature and the public discussion about tax complexity (as described above), we derive
the following hypotheses regarding these two objectives.
Our first objective is to document preferences for tax simplification among a repre-
sentative sample of the population and to understand related aspects of tax simplification.
Our expectation with respect to this objective is that the support for tax simplification
is very high. This expectation builds on the observation that both the public debate
and the professional discussion (in academic literature and press) are centered around
critiques about overly complex tax systems and proposals to simplify taxes. Important
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economic arguments in support of a certain degree of tax complexity play a considerably
less prominent role. In light of the debates, asking people about their desire to simplify
taxes then presumably triggers a natural and obvious reply, namely that the tax system
needs simplification.16 We provide first survey evidence documenting if the support for
tax simplification is as high as we would expect in light of the debates about this topic.
Our second objective immediately builds on the first objective. We aim to under-
stand if the (presumably large) overall support for tax simplicity is to some extent driven
by a lack of awareness about the trade-offs behind complex and simple tax systems. Our
first strategy towards this objective is forcing people to think about tax-relevant situa-
tions that are potentially familiar to them and then let them decide how the tax system,
in their view, should deal with these situations. Because the debate about complexity is
leaning towards simplification, we deliberately confront individuals with scenarios which
they do not immediately relate to the debate about complexity and deliberately do not
mention to them that their decisions could have implications for tax complexity. This
allows us to investigate individuals’ preferences towards complexity-adding components
in the tax system in the absence of the public-discussion-induced prejudices towards more
tax simplicity. Our expectation for this part of the paper is that the share of people who
indicate that the tax system should not account for certain differences in living situation
(and thus be as simple as possible) is considerably smaller than the share of people who
generally support to have a simpler tax system. It is of course possible to believe that
the system should account for the described differences in living situations and at the
same time think that the overall tax system should be somewhat simpler. However, if
the general support for simplification is considerably higher than the share of people who
think that the system should not account for differences across people, then this could
point in the direction that some people are indeed not aware of certain aspects of tax
complexity.
The three scenarios that we present to respondents differ with respect to their degree
of being circumstantial (exogenous) to taxpayers or the result of a choice. Building on the
literature on optimal taxation and equality of opportunity (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos
2005; Durante et al. 2014; Ooghe and Peichl 2015), we further hypothesize that the share
of people who believe that circumstantial living situations should be accounted for in the
tax system, is higher than the share of people who believe that chosen living situations
should be accounted for.
The second strategy in the context of our second objective builds on randomized
survey components that expose participants to information/arguments against and in
support of tax simplification. The rationale for this approach is simple: if the provided
16To some extent (and certainly exaggerated), asking for general simplification preferences could turn
out to be similar to asking people if they wish to have a higher disposable income.
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information shift individuals’ preferences, then individuals are indeed not aware of certain
aspects of tax simplification. We hypothesize that misperceptions and a lack of awareness
are less prevalent when it comes to information against tax simplification. As a result,
shifts in preferences are presumably larger in response to information against simplifi-
cation than to responses in support of simplification. This hypothesis (again) builds on
the observation that both the public debate and the professional discussion are centered
around tax simplification.
Overall, our paper and the hypotheses relate to papers that emphasize the impor-
tance of the public opinion and the role of taxpayers as voters for the design of the tax
system (e.g., Hettich and Winer 1988). We expect that the public opinion is dependent
on context and information, and that attitudes towards tax simplicity of taxpayers/voters
are more nuanced than it apparently seems on first glance.
3 The Survey
3.1 German Internet Panel
Our questions are embedded in the German Internet Panel (henceforth: GIP).17 The GIP
is a longitudinal survey that is operated and administered at the University of Mannheim
in Germany.18 The main purpose of the panel survey is to collect ’data on individual
attitudes and preferences relevant in political and economic decision making processes’.
GIP data are collected online on a bi-monthly basis. The survey is representative for
the German population aged 16 to 75 (see Blom et al. 2015 for more details on its
representativity). Recruitment was conducted offline with face-to-face interviews, during
which respondents were invited to the online panel. To ensure the representativeness of
the sample, the GIP includes respondents without prior computer or Internet access by
providing them with the necessary equipment and training (Blom et al. 2017).
The survey includes repeated questions (included in every wave) as well as questions
only included in single waves. We included a block of questions in wave 36, which went
to the field in July 2018 and included 2464 participants (summary statistics below).
17The background information about the GIP in this subsection are partly based on the respective
subsection in Doerrenberg and Peichl (2018).
18To be more precise, the survey is based at the ”Collaborative Research Center 884 on Political
Economy of Reforms”, which is funded by the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft, SFB 884). See http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/ for background information on
the research center. Also see the general survey description in Blom et al. (2015) and at http:
//reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_panel/home/. Examples of GIP-based papers include Ker-
schbamer and Mu¨ller (2017), Mu¨ller and Renes (2017), Dolls and Wehrhoefer (2018), Engelmann et al.
(2018), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2018) and Blesse and Heinemann (2019).
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3.2 Survey Structure and Questions
We designed a block of 10 survey questions and integrated these questions into the GIP.
Our question block focuses on matters of tax simplicity and for our analysis we can
complement the results from our questions with the results from other questions in the
same wave and other waves of the GIP (for example, background characteristics of the
participants are available although they are not surveyed in our question block). Our
questions were embedded in a regular wave of the GIP (wave 36, July 2018) and were
surrounded by other GIP questions.
Our survey questions and the respective reply categories are shown in full in the
Appendix.19 The GIP has a professional and experienced team of survey experts who
supported us in developing and formulating our survey questions. Our questions therefore
meet up-to-date standards of survey methodology. The survey and its structure (in
chronological order) are summarized in the following.
• Introduction: Opener stating that the next set of questions will be about the
tax system in Germany and in particular about whether the German income-tax
system is complicated or easy to understand. The opener also includes a general
statement that the degree of complexity particularly depends on the number of
possible tax expenditures. This latter statement thus explains to participants which
dimension of complexity we are particularly interested in. The opener also makes
all respondents, independent of treatment status, aware of the topic and ensures
that the topic is made equally salient to all respondents.
• Q1: Difficulty of filing a tax return: We ask participants how difficult they
find it to file their tax return. We use this question to derive a proxy for the
perceived difficulty of the tax system and to investigate whether other questions
and treatment responses depend on the degree of perceived tax complexity.
• Randomized Experiment 1: Participants are randomly assigned to three groups
that are exposed to different information and arguments in the context of tax sim-
plification. See below for more info.
• Q2: Preferences for tax simplification: We ask participants if they think
whether the income-tax system in Germany generally needs to be simplified. This
question elicits preferences for tax simplification and also is a potential outcome
variable in the analysis of the effects of the randomized information.
19These are the translated survey questions. The original German questions are available upon request
from the authors and will also be available on the GIP website (https://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/
internet_panel/Questionnaires/).
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• Q3: General need for tax reform: The question surveys if participants in
general think that the German tax system is in need of reform.
• Q4: Distributional implications of tax expenditures: The question measures
participants’ beliefs about the distributional effects of tax expenditures. We partic-
ularly survey whether someone beliefs that tax expenditures contribute to a fairer
distribution of income or if they tend to benefit high-income taxpayers.
• Q5: Which type of tax-simplifying reform: We offer different types of tax
reforms that potentially contribute to simplification of the tax system. Participants
are asked to indicate which type of reform they prefer under the assumption that
all the listed reforms are revenue neutral.
• Q6-Q8: Should the tax system account for differences in living situa-
tions?: In each of these three questions, we present to the survey respondents the
living situations of two fictitious taxpayers A and B (see Weinzierl 2014, Saez and
Stantcheva 2016 and Weinzierl 2017 for similar survey question techniques). Re-
spondents are told that A and B earn the same gross income and are very similar in
all other (tax relevant) means, but only differ in one particular dimension. We have
three different scenarios of varying living situations, and for each scenario we ask
participants if A and B should pay the same amount of taxes or if any of the two
should pay more. In the three presented scenarios, A and B differ with respect to
i) the amount that has to be paid for elderly care of a poor mother, ii) the amount
that is given to charity, and iii) the distance they commute to work. The three
scenarios are presented in random order to avoid any order effects.
The choice of these three type of tax expenditures is motivated by their economic
importance and real-world prevalence. Tax expenditures for commuting, charitable
giving and elderly care are substantial and large in size, with commuting expen-
ditures being the largest income related expense recognized by tax authorities in
Germany; in 2017, tax expenditures related to commuting alone amounted to about
5 billion Euro (WiWo 2017). Moreover, these items are used by many taxpayers;
about 35 percent of the taxpayers use the commuting expenditure, about 24 percent
of the taxpayers deduct charitable contributions from their tax base, and approxi-
mately 8 percent of the taxpayers use the elderly care deductions (own calculations
based on German administrative tax records (FAST); see FAST 2010).20 Overall,
20The Factually Anonymous Income Tax Statistic (FAST) is a 10% stratified random sample of the
German Income Tax Statistics, comprising information about taxable income, family situation, income
sources, granted deductions and exemptions, revenues and sources of revenues, income tax burden, etc.
The data are available as cross-section scientific use files. For the tax-expenditure calculations here we
use the most recent available year of 2010. See Boenke and Schroeder (2017) for more information.
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the tax expenditures that we chose to rely on in these questions are very important,
salient and likely to be familiar to most of our survey respondents.
In addition, these three tax expenditures represent three different rationales for tax
expenditures, namely i) circumstances that are outside of the control of the respec-
tive taxpayer (elderly care), ii) positive externalities associated with the (self cho-
sen) expenditure (charitable giving) and iii) items representing job-related choices
of taxpayers (commuting).
• Randomized Experiment 2: Participants are again randomly assigned to three
groups that see different information and arguments in the context of tax simplifi-
cation (renewed randomization). See below for more info.
• Q9: Preferences for tax simplification: We again elicit preferences for tax
simplification (as in Q2). We explain to participants that we ask the same question
again because the topic was subject of some of the previous questions and par-
ticipants might have developed a different view on it in the course of the survey
questions. The question primarily serves as an outcome variable for the second set
of experiments.
• Q10: Own use of tax expenditures: We survey which tax expenditures partic-
ipants usually make use of in their annual income tax declaration.
3.3 Randomized Survey Experiments
We include two randomized components into our survey block on tax simplification (see
the survey structure above). The two experiments are preceded by separate random-
ization processes. In both experiments, respondents are randomly assigned to either a
control group or one of two treatment groups (i.e. between-subjects design with three
groups). An alternative to having two separate experiments would have been one single
experiment with more treatment groups. However, in light of the number of participants
and the rather subtle experimental interventions, we decided to choose to include two
randomized components in order to maximize statistical power.
Both experiments are structured in the same way: i) We first have a short opener
that serves as a connecting passage to the subsequently provided information. The opener
again explains that tax expenditures potentially contribute to the complexity of the tax
system. All participants (control group and treatment groups) see this opener. The
opener therefore ensures that the issues of tax expenditures and complexity are made
equally aware to control-group participants and treatment-group participants. Any treat-
ment effects are therefor not driven by differences in the extent of topic awareness across
the groups. ii) After the opener, respondents in the two treatment groups are provided
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short information/arguments in the context of tax simplification. iii) Respondents in all
three groups move on to the next survey question.
The information that we provide in the treatments pick up some of the most fre-
quently debated issues and empirical findings in the context of tax simplification; the
treatments are all reflected in the cited literature and presented arguments in section 1
and 2.1. In each of the two experiments, one treatment aims to shift preferences towards
tax simplification and the other one aims to shift preferences away from tax simplification.
Our treatments thus reflect that there are arguments both against and in support of tax
simplification. In addition, we are able to investigate if preferences for tax simplification
are more elastic with respect to arguments in support or against tax simplification.21 We
describe and motivate the two experiments in the following.
Experiment 1. The first experiment includes two treatments which we label Redis-
tribution treatment and Avoidance treatment. The two treatments are preceded by an
opener that is shown to all respondents (i.e., both treatment groups and control group).
The opener is everything that control-group respondents see in the context of the first
experiment before they move to the next survey question. It ensures that respondents in
all treatment groups are made equally aware of the topic of tax complexity. The opener
reads as follows:
In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is
too complicated because of many possible deductions and allowances.
The Redistribution treatment highlights that tax expenditures, which add to tax
complexity, potentially have redistributional effects and can be used to reduce the tax
liability of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances. The treatment addresses
the point that tax expenditures can serve as a social-policy measure and presents a
potential argument in support of a certain degree of complexity. Those respondents
who are initially not aware of the link between tax expenditures and social-policy aspects
might reconsider their tax-simplicity preferences in response to the treatment and become
less supportive of tax simplification. The treatment text follows directly after the opener
and reads as follows:
However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with many possible
deductions and allowances has an important social-policy role, particularly in
relation to income redistribution. For example, tax deductions can be used to
reduce the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances.
21The treatment structure is not augmented, meaning that respondents in the second treatment group
do not see both the information in the first treatment group and the information from the second
treatment group, but only see the information from the second treatment group.
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The Avoidance treatment highlights the frequently debated point that the exis-
tence of many complexity-adding tax expenditures potentially facilitates tax avoidance
and tax evasion. Assuming that most people disapprove tax avoidance and evasion, re-
spondents who were initially not fully aware of the potential link between tax complexity
and avoidance/evasion might shift their preferences towards more simplification in re-
sponse to being exposed to this treatment. The treatment text follows directly after the
opener and reads as follows:
In this context, one argument is that a tax system with many possible de-
ductions and allowances offers greater opportunity for tax avoidance and tax
adjustment. For example, when individuals have a better knowledge of the tax
system or make unjustified declarations, they can reduce their tax burden by
taking advantage of certain allowances or deductions.
Experiment 2. The second experiment includes two treatments, labeled Efficiency
treatment and Special interest treatment. The two treatments are preceded by an opener
that is shown to all respondents (i.e., both treatment groups and control group). As
before in the first experiment, this opener is everything that control-group respondents
see in the context of this second experiment. It ensures that respondents in all treatment
groups are equally aware of the general topic, tax complexity. The opener reads as follows:
We would like to once again address the ongoing debate concerning whether
the income tax system is too complicated due to the many possible deductions
and allowances.
The Efficiency treatment highlights the argument that efficiency is potentially
higher in a complex system with many tax expenditures because such a system provides
the opportunity to tailor taxes to individual situations and, thus, to tax individual ca-
pacity and ability. The treatment therefore increases awareness for a potential argument
against tax simplification, and potentially shifts preferences away from tax simplification
– at least among those respondents who did not consider this argument initially. The
treatment is presented immediately after the opener and reads as follows:
One argument that is often used against tax simplification and that has not
been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions and allowances
provides better opportunities to tax individuals in accordance with their ability
to pay and is therefore economically more efficient.
The Special Interest treatment highlights that a complex system with many tax
expenditures is more vulnerable to the lobbying activities of special interest groups. The
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argument is that special interest groups try to bargain favorable tax treatment and the
existence of many complexity-adding exemptions facilitates the groups’ efforts; a system
with a narrow tax base and without tax expenditures would make it more to difficult
to implement special interests in the tax system. Provided that most people agree that
special interests should not be accounted for in the tax system, this second treatment
provides an argument in support of tax simplification. The treatment text, that follows
right after the opener, is formulated as follows:
One argument that is often used in favor of tax simplification and that has not
been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions and allowances
offers special interest groups greater opportunity for obtaining exemptions for
their clientele.
Discussion of Experimenter Demand Effects and Power Analyses. One fre-
quently raised concern with survey experiments (and surveys in general) is that experi-
menter demand effects drive the survey responses and results. A recent study by Mum-
molo and Peterson (2019) presents a large and carefully conducted test of experimenter
demand effects in the context of survey experiments. They run online survey experiments
with more than 12,000 participants and randomly assign information about experimenter
intent. They find that providing these information does not affect treatment effects; even
financial incentives to respond in line with experimenters’ intent did not trigger any de-
mand effects. These findings provide evidence that survey experiments are on average
robust to experimenter demand effects. The findings are consistent with the results of
de Quidt et al. (2018). They use a similar approach in online experiments and find that
experimenter demand effects are ’small’.
The main survey question in our paper, preferences for tax simplicity, asks respon-
dents for their view on a specific aspect of policy. There is neither a correct or false answer
to this question nor is it in anyhow ethically critical. Participants are therefore not under
the impression that they must provide a particular answer and social-desirability bias
should thus not matter here. In addition, the question is very similar to the questions
that GIP-participants are used to. The information that treatment participants receive
prior to replying to the tax-simplicity preferences are provided in a very neutral and
objective way, and thus do not induce subjects to provide a certain answer. Overall, the
intention behind our survey question and experimental interventions was certainly con-
siderably more subtle than in the above described two studies in the literature. In light of
the findings in the literature and the nature of our questions, we argue that experimenter
demand is not a critical concern in our survey experiment.
Note that performing ex-ante power analyses during the design stage of our survey
experiment was very difficult. The main survey question, preferences for tax simplicity,
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has neither been included in the GIP before nor are we aware of any other survey that
includes a similar question. It was therefore not possible to rely on any reliable predictions
regarding the standard deviation (and mean) for our main survey question at the point
of time when we designed the survey experiment. In light of a lack of comparable studies,
we could neither form any good expectations regarding the effect sizes that would occur
from our treatment interventions. However, these parameters are of course crucial for a
meaningful power analysis. In addition, we faced a given number of participants in the
GIP and it would have been difficult to adjust the sample size in response to the results of
an ex-ante power analysis. We therefore do not present the results of any ex-ante power
analyses.
3.4 Sample Characteristics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics with respect to the demographics of our survey
participants.22 Most demographics in Table 1 were not surveyed in the context of our
specific survey block on tax simplification, but in other parts of the same wave or in other
waves (some variables that do not change over time are linked to the current survey wave
through the panel character of the GIP). The descriptive results for the questions of our
survey block are not in this table, but are instead presented further below in the results
section 4.
The table shows that we have a survey sample with balanced gender composition
(48% female) and that we cover all age categories (with 36% of the participants being
older than 58, and 23% retired). 61% of the respondents are married. 17% of the sample
participants live in single households, 46% in 2-person households and 18% in households
with three people. The distribution of education levels is also very reasonable. We split
participants in different income categories and see that 11% are quite poor (net monthly
income less than 1500 EUR) and 15% are relatively rich (net monthly income greater
than 4500 EUR). The share of people in the three income classes in between poor and
rich are quite balanced.
Corresponding with low current unemployment rates in Germany, only about 2%
of the survey participants are unemployed. In terms of political affiliations, we see that
about 38% of the sample are in the rather conservative political spectrum and 47%
are rather left-wing. 8% indicate that they do not have any partisan preferences (left-
right preferences are elicited on a 11-point scale from right to left, where we classify
’conservative’ as <= 5 on this scale).
22Note that the GIP is designed to be representative of the German population, which is why it is
not necessary to compare the summary statistics of our sample with statistics from other representative
data, such as census data (see Blom et al. 2015 for more details on the GIP’s representativeness).
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3.5 Balancedness across Experimental Groups
Table 6 presents the results of balancing checks for our first experiment. Following the
strategy in Alesina et al. (2018), we test balance across groups as follows: For each co-
variate, we run three OLS regressions of the form yi = βCovariatei +i, where Covariate
is the respective covariate that we test. The three dependent variables for which we run
the regressions are dummies indicating the treatment groups – redistribution, avoidance,
and control group. As a result of this procedure, we have the results of 30 OLS regressions
(one regression for each combination of 10 covariates and 3 outcome dummies). Reassur-
ingly, we find strong evidence that randomization worked well and our covariates do not
predict treatment status. Out of 60 estimated coefficients, only 5 are significant at the
10% level and only one is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
This is well in line with these coefficients being significant by chance within their margin
of error.23
The equivalent strategy was used for testing balancedness of the second experiment;
see Table 7 which is structured just as the corresponding table for the first experiment
(Table 6). We here restrict the sample to respondents who were in the control group
of the first experiment (because we are interested in the effect of the second experiment
for this ’unencumbered’ group; see 4.4 for a more detailed explanation). The results are
again quite reassuring. Out of 60 coefficients, 7 are significant at conventional levels of
significane (10% or lower). Overall, randomization apparently worked out well, which is
not surprising given that the GIP computer system assigned respondents randomly to
treatment groups and selection into groups was not possible. Further below in our regres-
sions, we present specifications that condition on all observable covariates to mitigate all
remaining concerns regarding balancedness.
4 Results
This section presents the results of our survey on tax complexity. We proceed as follows.
First, we document in subsection 4.1 the preferences for tax simplification (Q2) and then
investigate the ’anatomy’ of these preferences (i.e., which observable characteristics are
correlated with the preferences). Second, in subsection 4.2, we report the results for
further survey questions on the topic of tax complexity. In particular, we document the
results for our survey questions w.r.t. difficulty of filing a return (Q1), general need for
tax reform (Q3), distributional aspects of simplification (Q4), and which tax expenditures
the participants use themselves (Q10). We then go and explore in steps 3 and 4 of
our analysis to which extent preferences for tax simplification are affected by awareness
23With 60 estimated coefficients, one would expect six coefficients with a significance level of 10% even
in the absence of any systematic difefrences between groups.
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w.r.t. the pros and cons of tax simplification; in particular: Third, we document in
subsection 4.3 if participants believe that the tax system should account for differences
in the living situations of taxpayers (Q6-Q8). Fourth, we present the results of the two
randomized survey experiments in subsection 4.4. Therein, we are particularly interested
in the experimental effects on preferences for tax simplification. Fifth, subsection 4.5
documents which type of tax-simplifying reform the survey respondents favor (Q5).
4.1 Preferences for Tax Simplification
Preferences Across all Respondents. We elicit preferences for tax simplicity using
a question which surveys whether people believe that the income-tax system in Germany
needs to be simplified (Q2 in the survey structure above). The reply categories were on
a 6-point scale from 1 ’Absolutely not’ to 6 ’Absolutely’.
Figure 2 presents the share of respondents in each reply category across all survey
respondents. A large majority believes that the tax system needs to be simplified: About
47% of the respondents checked reply category six, meaning that the system ’absolutely’
needs to be simplified. Another 20% of the respondents chose the second highest category
5. This then implies that about 2/3 of the respondents have strong (either category 5 or
6) preferences for tax simplification. 14.4% are in the middle category 4, and only about
7% of the respondents chose categories 1, 2 or 3, which indicate rather weak preferences
for tax simplification. The mean response across all respondents is 5.16.
The replies of respondents who are in one our information treatments might be
affected by the treatment information. However, the support for tax simplification is also
very high among respondents in the control group who did not receive any information;
the mean reply in the control group was 5.22.
Overall, the results provide clear evidence that preferences for tax simplicity in the
German population are very strong. We are able to confirm that the prevailing view
indeed is in strong favor of tax simplification. As a matter of fact, the strong preferences
for simplifications suggest that the support of simplification is the obvious choice for
participants as they fill out this survey question. We investigate further below if this
choice becomes less obvious as we increase awareness w.r.t. the trade-offs behind tax
complexity and tax simplification.
Anatomy of Preferences for Tax Simplification. In a next step, we study the
’anatomy’ of simplification preferences and investigate which groups (in terms of observ-
able characteristics) are more likely to have strong preferences for tax simplification. For
this purpose, we simply regress (using OLS) our measure of simplification preferences on
a wide set of observable characteristics. These characteristics comprise demographic fac-
tors, including gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement
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status and education, as well as a measure of perceived tax difficulty, household income
and political preferences. We report results with robust standard errors. The coefficients
in this regression are (conditional) correlations and should not be given a causal inter-
pretation. However, they nevertheless shed light on the heterogeneity of preferences and
allow us to gain a more nuanced picture.
The results for this anatomy analysis are presented in Table 2. Important demo-
graphic correlates of simplification preferences are age and gender. Older people tend to
have stronger preferences for simplification, and women have weaker preferences. Age
and gender differences are further investigated in Figures 14 and 15 which illustrate un-
conditional differences between age groups and between men and women, respectively.
Figure 14 shows that the average support for simplification steadily increases in age; the
support is 16% higher among respondents older than 58, relative to respondents younger
than 29. As illustrated in Figure 15, the support for simplification among men is roughly
3% greater than among women.
Another important correlate of simplification preferences is the perceived difficulty
of filing a tax return. Respondents who find it easy to file a tax return have lower simpli-
fication preferences than respondents who find it difficult. The unconditional relationship
between simplification preferences and perceived filing difficulty are displayed in Figure
16. The Figure confirms the intuitive result that the perceived difficulty to declare income
taxes is positively associated with support for tax simplification.
Interestingly, respondents who do not file their tax return themselves or employ a
tax preparer are more supportive of simplification than those who file themselves and find
it easy. These non-filers, however, have lower support for simplification than self-filers
who find it difficult to prepare the tax return.
4.2 Further Survey Questions
We surveyed further aspects in the context of tax complexity in order to learn more how
respondents think about the topic. We present the results question by question in the
following.
Difficulty of Filing a Return. We survey the perceived difficulty of filing a tax return
on a 5-point scale from 1 ’Very Easy’ to 5 ’Very Difficult’ (Q1). This question particu-
larly allows us to investigate if the substantially high preferences for tax simplification
correspond with the perceived difficulty to file a return.24 The results for this survey
question are summarized in Figure 3, which, again, presents the share of respondents in
each reply category.
24Recall that the question of perceived difficulty of filing a tax return was asked before treatment
information were presented.
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The right part of the Figure shows that more than 1/3 (34.7%) of the respondents
did not indicate their perceived difficulty, either because they do not file a return or
because they have their return filed by someone else (e.g., a tax preparer, spouse). Among
all respondents who file a return (i.e., the other 61.9%), about 18% (11.1/61.9) find it
’very difficult’ to file their return and 32% (19.6/61.9) checked category 4, which also
indicates a fair degree of difficulty. The medium category 3 was checked by about 28%
(17.5/61.9). About 22% ((10.8 + 2.9)/61.9) of the respondents find it rather easy to
file the return. The mean reply for this question is 3.41 (on a scale of 1-5) among all
respondents who file a tax return.
Overall, there is a tendency that tax returns are perceived to be fairly difficult,
but the picture is not as strong as in the case of preferences for tax simplification. This
corresponds with the ’anatomy’ result above: the positive correlation between simplifi-
cation preferences and perceived difficulty to file a return is not perfectly linear. This
suggests that the strong preference for tax simplification is not entirely motivated by own
experiences with too-difficult tax returns.
General Need for Tax Reforms. We also surveyed if participants believe that the
German tax system generally needs to be reformed (Q3). The question was asked on
a scale from 1 ’Absolutely not’ to 6 ’Absolutely’. Figure 4 shows that a large fraction
(39.4%) of survey respondents think that the tax system ’absolutely’ (reply category 6)
needs to be reformed. Another 23.4% also have a strong preference for reforming the
system (reply category 5). A negligible share of people do not see a need to implement
reforms; only about 7% of the respondents checked reply categories 1, 2 or 3. The mean
reply for this question is 5.06. The mean response in the control group is similar (5.09) to
the overall mean. Overall, this part of the survey provides clear evidence that Germans
believe that the tax system in their country is in strong need of reform.
Distributional Implications of Tax Expenditures. One frequently raised concern
in the context of tax complexity is that the rich are able to exploit tax expenditures better
than low-income taxpayers; for example, because they afford professional tax advisors or
because they have income sources with more possibilities for tax planning. However, given
that many tax expenditures also have a redistributive purpose, it is interesting to survey
the public opinion in this context. We therefore survey beliefs about the distributional
implications of tax expenditures. In particular, we ask if deductions and allowances
contribute to equality or if high-income taxpayers tend to benefit from them (Q4). The
reply categories are 1 ’Equality’ to 6 ’High Incomes Benefit’ and the question results are
summarized in Figure 5.
The results are unambiguous: the majority of respondents believe that allowances
and deductions benefit high-income taxpayers, rather than contributing to equality. 27.3%
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were in the corner category 6 and another 17% are in the second-largest reply category 5.
That is, almost 50 percent of the respondents were in those two categories which indicate
the highest beliefs that high-income taxpayers benefit from deductions and allowances.
Only about 24% of all respondents checked reply categories 1, 2 or 3. The mean reply
for this question is 4.33. This mean response for the overall sample is very similar to the
mean response in the control group (4.28). Overall, the large majority beliefs that tax
expenditures mostly benefit richer taxpayers.
Which Tax Expenditures are Used? We also survey which type of tax expenditures
respondents use regularly (Q10). This survey question mainly serves the purpose of
evaluating if survey answers about particular type of expenditures (see below section
4.3) are driven by self-interest. The question, however, is also interesting in itself and
we therefore briefly summarize the results in Figure 6. The Figure presents the share
of people who use particular tax expenditures (note that multiple answers were possible
so the shares do not add up to 100). The list of itemized deductions is, of course, not
exhaustive. The most frequently used tax expenditures in our sample are the commuting-
to-work allowance, the deduction of other type of work expenses (e.g., work-related costs
for books, clothes, etc.), charitable donations, and deductible expenses for pension and
retirement savings. Child allowances and so-called ’standard deductions’25 are also quite
frequently used.
4.3 Different Tax Burden for Taxpayers in Different Living Sit-
uations?
In the next set of questions (Q6-Q8), we face respondents with two fictitious taxpayers
who differ in one aspect of their living situation, and then ask if these two taxpayers
should pay the same amount of taxes. While a differential tax treatment of the two
fictitious taxpayers would add complexity to the tax system, we do not mention this
complexity aspect of the presented scenario explicitly to respondents. These questions
allow us to evaluate if respondents prefer to account for different living situations through
the tax system at the cost of adding complexity to the tax system. In other words, if
people indicated that specific differences in living situations should matter for the tax
burden, this would imply that they do not desire the simplest possible tax system and
are willing to accept a certain degree of tax complexity.
All three questions are structured in the same way. We ask respondents to imagine
two fictitious taxpayers, A and B, who are comparable in all tax relevant aspects, and
only differ along one of the following dimensions:
25This represents the lump sum deduction amount for taxpayers who do not exceed the thresholds in
other deduction categories.
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i) Person A has to spend a considerable amount for the elderly care of her mother,
while Person B does not have to bear such costs.
ii) Person A spends a considerable amount of income on charitable giving, while Person
B does not donate.
iii) Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work, while Person B lives close
to work.
We then ask who of the two persons, A or B, should pay more taxes (where the
order of reply categories and the order of presented scenarios was randomized). The
results are presented in Figures 7 to 9.26
Figure 7 shows that a majority of about 60% of the survey respondents believe that
the costs for elderly care should reduce the tax burden. In other words, a majority of
about approximately 2/3 of respondents think that the tax system should account for
this difference in living situation, and that Person B should pay more taxes. Almost
40% indicate that taxpayers with and without costs for elderly care should pay the same
amount of taxes, and almost nobody thinks that A should pay more in taxes.
Figure 10 shows that these effects are not driven by self-interest. We split the
sample into those who make use of deductions for care costs themselves and those who
do not. The survey responses among these two groups look very similar. Even among
those who do not use care deductions themselves, a majority of almost 60% believes that
Person B, who does not have care costs, should pay more taxes. Among those who use
the deduction themselves, a little bit more than 60% think that Person B should pay
more.27 Overall, these survey responses provide clear evidence that people favor a system
in which the costs for elderly care are deductible from the tax base.
For the survey questions regarding charitable donations (Figure 8) and expenses for
commuting (Figure 9) we see that a majority of about 66% and 59% of the respondents
think that both persons, A and B, should pay the same amounts of taxes, respectively.
That is, about 2/3 think that differences in charitable donations and commuting expenses
should not imply differential tax payments.
However, a fraction of 32% and 39% of all respondents yet think that higher dona-
tions and commuting costs should imply lower tax burdens. That is, roughly 1/3 of the
respondents believe that differential expenses in these areas should result in a reduced
tax burden. This is a considerably smaller share than in the case of elderly care, but 1/3
of respondents still is a substantial fraction that is in favor of accounting for these living
situations in the tax system.
26Note that the responses here were not affected by the randomized interventions.
27We acknowledge that it might be possible that a few taxpayers, who do not currently use this tax
expenditure, expect to use it in the future. A support of this tax expenditure might then be driven by
self-interest, even if they do not currently make use of the tax expenditure.
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The difference between the ’elderly care’ situation and the other two situations
is interesting: Costs for elderly care are circumstantial and outside the control of the
respective taxpayer, while donations and commuting distance are choices of the taxpayer.
Consistent with the literature on optimal taxation and equality of opportunity (e.g.,
Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Durante et al. 2014; Ooghe and Peichl 2015), our survey
respondents have the intuition that circumstantial differences should be accounted for to
a larger extent by the tax system than deliberate and self-chosen differences.
In line with this, the responses for donations and commuting expenses are more
affected by self-interest, as compared to the responses for elderly care. Figures 11 and 12
present the results separately for those who use the respective tax expenditure themselves
and those who do not. In the case of donations, a quarter of those respondents who do
not use the donation expenditure themselves think that donations should reduce the tax
burden, while the share is 45% among those who do use the donation expenditure. The
pattern is similar for the case of commuting expenditures: among those who do not use
the commuting expenditure, 34% believe that it should reduce in a lower tax burden.
Among those who do use the commuting expenditure, the share of people who believe
commuting should reduce tax payments stands at 47%.
Overall, the differences between those who use the respective tax expenditure and
those who do not are thus larger in the case of donations and commuting than for the
case of elderly care. However, even for donations and commuting we still see that a large
share of those who do not use the expenditure support the notion that the tax system
should account for the respective living situation. This suggests that the result for none
of the three different tax expenditures is entirely driven by self-interest.
4.4 Randomized Survey Experiments
Empirical Strategy. We now present the results of the two randomized survey exper-
iments. In case of the first experiment, we use OLS regressions (with robust standard
errors) in which we regress the respective outcome variable on dummy variables indicating
the two information treatments. The resulting coefficients then present the effect of the
respective treatment relative to the omitted control group. In our preferred specification,
we include control variables to improve precision of the treatment effects.
In case of the second experiment, we expect that the treatments of the first exper-
iment impact the treatment effects of the second experiment. For example, consider a
respondent who was assigned to the con-simplification treatment in the first experiment
and to the pro-simplification treatment in the second experiment. A positive effect of the
pro-argument in the second experiment might then cancel out with the negative effect of
the con-argument of the first experiment and, as a result, we see no effect in the second
experiment, although there actually is a positive effect. We circumvent this concern as
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follows: We first fully interact dummies indicating treatment status of the second ex-
periment with dummies indicating treatment status of the first experiment (the control
group always being the reference category), and then use OLS (with robust standard
errors) to regress the outcome variable of interest on the full set of interactions. We only
report the coefficients of the treatment dummies of the second experiment (and not the
interactions). These reported coefficients then present the effects of the second experi-
ment for those respondents who were in the control group of the first experiment. These
respondents have not received any prior treatment in the context of simplification and
therefore are ’unencumbered’ when they enter the second experiment.28 As with the first
experiment, our preferred specifications include control variables which improve precision
of the treatment coefficient of interest.
The main outcome variables are the responses to the question of whether the tax
system should be simplified; i.e., Q2 in the case of the first experiment and Q9 in case
of the second experiment. These are the variables that follow immediately after the
respective randomized intervention. The variable that we use in the regressions is coded
just as the original survey question, on a six-point scale, in order to not throw away any
information. In the context of the first experiment, we further study the treatment effects
on the survey question regarding the perceived distributional effects of expenditures (Q4).
This variable is also coded as the original survey variable (on a 6-point scale). We also
looked at the effects of the experimental intervention on the question about the general
need to reform the tax system (Q3). However, we did not detect any effects for this
question and therefore do not report the results.
We use OLS for reasons of eased interpretation. Ordered probit models, which
account for the discrete and ordered nature of the outcome variables, are presented in
robustness checks.
4.4.1 Experiment 1
Main Effects. Table 3 presents the main results for the first experiment, in which
we provide information about the social-policy role of tax expenditures (Redistribution
group) and about expenditure-induced tax avoidance opportunities (Avoidance group) in
complex tax systems. Preferences for tax simplicity (Q2) is the outcome variable in all
specifications of the table.
Column (1) of the table shows the effects of the treatment dummies in a regres-
sion specification without conditioning on any additional covariates. The other columns
28The coefficients that we report for the second experiment are identical to coefficients that are esti-
mated in regressions in which the sample is restricted to respondents who were in the control group in
the first experiment. We use the full interaction model, and not the sample-split variant, because this
approach improves precision and the resulting coefficients are based on the same sample that is used for
the regressions for the first experiment.
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gradually add further variables in order to increase efficiency and test the sensitivity
with respect to covariates. Column (2) adds several demographic control variables, and
Columns (3), (4) and (5) additionally condition on the perceived difficulty to file a tax
return, household income and political preferences, respectively.
The regression results in all specifications show negative effects of the Redistribution
treatment on preferences for tax simplification (all estimates statistically significant at the
5% level). The coefficients are remarkably stable across the five different specifications.
In Column (5), our preferred specification where we include all covariates, the support
for tax simplification is reduced by about 2.6% (−0.133/5.22 = coefficient/control-group
average), relative to the control-group average. The regressions thus provide evidence
that preferences for tax simplicity are elastic to information against tax simplification.
The effect size is not very large, but it has to be considered in light of the fact that
the overall support for tax simplification is substantial and, given the debate in the public
and press outlets, presumably is strongly anchored among respondents. Our treatment
thus affects preferences for tax simplification although the conventional wisdom on the
topic is very clear and strong. For these reasons, we argue, the effect size should be
interpreted as non-negligible.
The Avoidance-treatment does not have a significant effect on simplification pref-
erences. The coefficients are small and not statistically significant throughout the five
specifications. The standard errors in all five specifications are considerably greater than
the respective coefficient. Statistical precision is thus much weaker than in the case
of the Redistribution-treatment. The coefficients are also considerably different: across
all specifications, the coefficients of the Redistribution-treatment are at least 2.7 times
larger than the coefficients of the Avoidance-treatment, and the difference between the
two is statistically significant throughout specifications (3) to (5) (with p-values in the
range of 0.064 to 0.057).29 We also tried different specifications of the outcome variable
(e.g., a dummy variable indicating very high support for simplification) but never find a
significant effect of the Avoidance-treatment.
The results thus show that preferences for simplification are not elastic to the infor-
mation in support of tax simplification. This null-result might be explained with the very
prominent role of arguments in favor of simplification in the public debate. As a result of
these salient arguments, participants presumably have less misperceptions regarding in-
formation that support simplification. The high initial support for tax simplicity among
participants (which does not leave much room for even more support) might also play a
role.30
29Negative coefficients of the Avoidance-treatment are consistent with the treatment having no effect.
If two independent samples are drawn from the same population, it is very likely that one sample is
smaller than the other one.
30Note that the constant decreases as we subsequently add control variables across the regression
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We also investigated the effect of the first experimental intervention on respondents’
views about the distributional implications of tax complexity (Q4). The results of this
exercise are presented in Table 4, which is structured like the previously discussed Table 3.
The Redistribution-treatment does not affect these beliefs (relative to the control group).
The coefficients are close to zero and not significantly different from zero. However, the
information about possible complexity-induced avoidance possibilities in the Avoidance-
group somewhat affect the distributional beliefs. The treatment coefficient is statistically
significant in specifications (3) to (5), and indicates that the treatment increases beliefs
that tax expenditures add to income inequality (the coefficients in specifications (1)
and (2) are imprecisely measured). Considering the specification in column (5), which
includes all covariates, the treatment increased the distributional-beliefs variable by about
4% (0.169/4.285), relative to the control-group average. Comparing the coefficients of
the Redistribution-treatment and the Avoidance-treatment, we find statistical significant
differences for specifications (3) to (5) with p-values ranging from 0.09 to 0.064.
Results for the experimental effects on both tax simplification attitudes and dis-
tributional views are robust to using Ordered Probit regressions that account for the
discrete nature of the outcome variables; the respective results are shown in Tables 8 and
9.
Randomization Tests and Multiple Hypothesis Testing. In a next step, we in-
vestigate if the (robust) OLS standard errors that we reported above are robust to other
ways of computing standard errors. In particular, we adjust standard errors using i) ran-
domization tests in the spirit of Fisher (1935) and ii) tests for multiple comparisons that
follow the procedure proposed by Westfall and Young (1993). Note that the coefficients
are not affected by the alternative types of statistical inference that we present in the
following.
First, we perform randomization tests following Young (2018). The Young (2018)-
procedure performs exact tests which test the sharp null hypothesis that the effect of
the information treatment is zero for all individuals receiving our treatment. That is, it
does not test whether the average treatment effect is zero (which is what we tested in
our main analysis), but whether the treatment effects are zero across all repondents. The
randomization-test procedure, which is in the spirit of Fisher (1935), is more conservative
in computing standard errors: Young (2018) reports that, using his approach, the number
of significant results of randomized experiments is considerably reduced relative to con-
ventional tests of individual treatment effects. Compared to classical asymptotic-based
testing procedures, these randomization tests have the advantage that they are robust
against concentrated leverage and do not rely on sample size or the characteristics of the
specifications. This suggests that our control variables can explain a considerable part of the high
baseline support for simplification.
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error (Young 2018).31
Using the Young (2018)-procedure with 5000 draws (to approximate the p-value
of the Fisher distribution), the effect of the Redistribution-treatment on preferences for
simplification yields a p-value of 0.015 (in our preferred specification with the full set of
controls). The coefficients are thus statistically significant and the levels of significance of
the classical testing method – as reported above – are confirmed. This stricter procedure
for computing p-values also confirms the insignificant effect of our Avoidance-treatment
on preferences for tax simplicity; the p-value for the Avoidance-dummy is computed to
be 0.6 and thus far off conventional levels of statistical significance.
Overall, all p-values based on the randomization tests are very similar to the ones
obtained by ordinary OLS with robust standard errors. This is reassuring and lends
credibility to the inference used in our main analyses above (which used classical hypoth-
esis testing). The similarity between p-values might be interpreted as an indication that
the treatment effects in our setting are constant among individuals; as noted by Ding
(2017), the sharp-null hypothesis and the null hypothesis of zero average causal effect are
equivalent in the case of constant causal effects.
Second, we use the method proposed by Westfall and Young (1993), and for ex-
ample recently applied by Blattman et al. (2017), to adjust standard errors for multiple
comparisons. As Blattman et al. (2017), we take a rather conservative approach that
adjusts for comparisons across treatments and outcomes: in our first experiment, the
combination of three outcome variables and two treatments implies that six hypothesis
are tested (i.e., for each outcome variable, two treatment effects are tested relative to the
control group). We tested the effect of our information treatments on the following three
outcome variables: preferences for tax simplification (Q2), general need for tax reform
(Q3), distributional implications of tax expenditures (Q4). Note that we only reported
in detail the results for outcomes Q2 and Q4 because we did not find any effects of the
treatment on Q3. However, since we initially intended to study the effect on all three
outcome variables, the correct procedure here requires that we adjust standard errors to
the case with three outcomes and two treatments.
Using the Westfall and Young (1993)-procedure to adjust standard errors for mul-
tiple comparisons, we find a standard error of 0.083 for the effect of the Redistribution-
treatment on preferences for tax simplification (based on our preferred specification with
the full set of control variables). The effect of the Avoidance-treatment on preferences
for tax simplification is insignificant with a p-value of 0.84. We thus confirm the classical
p-values regarding the treatment effects on our main outcome variable, preferences for
tax simplification. The p-value of Avoidance on the perceived distributional implications,
31We implement the randomization tests using the ado file provided by Alwyn Young on his website;
the exact testing procedure is described in (Young 2018). We report randomization-t tests since the
author finds in practice “randomization-t to be superior to the -c”.
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which is significant in the classical inference approach, stands at 0.24 with this method
and therefore turns insignificant. All other hypotheses are insignificant with p-values
greater than 0.7.
Heterogenous Treatment Effects. In a next step of the analysis, we investigate if
particular groups of respondents respond differently to the treatments of the first experi-
ment than other groups of respondents. For this purpose, we interact the treatment-group
dummies with the observable characteristics of the sample population; in particular we
test if there are heterogenous effects with respect to the following variables: age, gender,
marital status, household size, income, education, political preferences, difficulty of filing
a tax return, trust in government, the perceived quality of tax use for public spending,
taste for redistribution (from wave 34 of the GIP), beliefs in luck or effort, and social
mobility perceptions (from wave 33 of the GIP). Overall, the effects of the treatments
seem to be very homogenous. We mostly do not see any significant interactions. For
reasons of brevity and given these results, we do not report the regression results. We
acknowledge that it is possible that the interaction models for detecting heterogeneity
lack statistical power, rather than providing evidence of homogenous treatment effects.
The finding that treatment effects seem to be rather constant across observable charac-
teristics is consistent with the above finding that the classical standard errors and the
adjusted standard errors using the Young (2018)-procedure are very similar.
4.4.2 Experiment 2
Main Effects. The main results for our second randomized intervention are presented
in Table 5, which is organized as the corresponding table for the first experiment. This
second experiment includes a control group, a group that is presented an Efficiency
argument against tax simplification, and a group that is presented a Special interest group
argument in favor of tax simplicity. The dependent variable is the question surveying
tax-simplicity preferences (note that Q9 is the dependent variable here, not Q2 which
we use for the first experiment). Consistent with the results from the first experiment,
we observe that preferences for tax simplicity are elastic towards information against tax
simplification, and not elastic to information in favor of simplification.
The estimated coefficient for the Efficiency-treatment is negative and statistically
significant throughout all five specifications of the regression table. Column 5, our pre-
ferred specification with all covariates, shows that the efficiency argument reduced support
for tax simplicity by about 5% (= 0.240/5.084), relative to the control-group average.
The effect size should again be considered in light of the fact that the general wisdom
clearly holds that tax simplification is desirable; we therefore consider a 5% effect size to
be non-negligible.
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The estimates for the effect of the Special interest group argument in favor of tax
simplicity are very close to zero and non-significant in all of the regression specifications.
Notably, the coefficient of the Efficiency-treatment is at least three times larger than the
coefficient of the Special interest group-treatment across the five specifications. However,
these differences between the two treatment estimates are not statistically significant,
presumably due to power reasons since we only compare reactions for participants who
have been in the control group in the first experiment. The null result of the Special
interest group-treatment is, again, likely to be driven by the more prominent role of
arguments in favor of simplification in the public debate, which reduce misperceptions
regarding pro-simplification arguments.
As shown in Table 10, these results are robust to using ordered probit models.
Randomization Tests and Multiple Hypothesis Testing. As with the first ex-
periment, we again adjust standard errors using Young (2018)-type randomization tests
and Westfall and Young (1993)-type tests for multiple comparisons. Note that we only
have one outcome variable (preferences for tax simplicity) and two treatment groups here,
implying that we test only two hypotheses in the context of this second experiment.
First, the randomization tests come with a p-value for the effect of the Efficiency-
treatment on preferences for tax simplification of 0.019 (in our preferred specification
with full set of controls). That is, the previously reported significance for the Efficiency-
treatment is confirmed. The effect of the Special interest group-treatment remains in-
significant with a p-value above 0.5. As with the first experiment, the p-values are
remarkably similar to the p-values from classical testing methods. This is reassuring and
again indicates that our treatment effects are constant across participants.
Second, the Westfall and Young (1993) method finds adjusted p-values of 0.043 for
the Efficiency-treatment and 0.48 for the Special interest group-treatment (both in spec-
ifications with the full set of control variables). The procedure thus confirms the classical
inference procedure that treatment Efficiency has a significant effect, while treatment
Special interest group does not.
Heterogenous Treatment Effects. As in the case of the first experiment, we investi-
gate if particular groups of respondents respond differently to the treatments of the first
experiment than other groups. We run the same interaction models as in the case of
the first experiment (with the same interacted observable variables) and again find that
effects of the treatments are very homogenous across different demographic groups; we
mostly do not detect any significant interactions. For reasons of brevity and given these
results, we again do not report the regression results. We acknowledge, again, that it
is possible that the interaction models for detecting heterogeneity lack statistical power,
rather than providing evidence of homogenous effects. However, the lack of heterogeneity
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is consistent with the finding that exact p-values following Young (2018) are very similar
to the classical p-values.
4.5 Which Simplifying Tax Reform?
In light of the conventional wisdom that tax simplification is desirable, we included a
question to survey how policy should reform the tax system in order to make it simpler.
For the purpose of this question, we provided respondents with a list of potential tax-
simplifying reforms and they could chose which of the offered alternatives they prefer.
This list is of course not exhaustive, it yet features some of the most debated type
of reforms. Respondents are explicitly informed that they should consider each of the
reforms under the assumption of tax-revenue neutrality (i.e., no effects on tax revenues
through the respective reforms) in order to abstract from revenue considerations.32
The results for this question are summarized in Figure 13. The most frequently
chosen type of reform (33%) increases the progressivity of the tax system and abolishes
all types of tax expenditures. About 20% of the respondents would prefer a flat-rate
system which features the same amount of tax expenditures as in the status quo. 15% of
respondents also want a flat-rate system, but without any possibilities for deductions or
allowances.
About 18% of the respondents prefer a different type of tax simplification. Instead
of reforming rates or the amount of tax expenditures, they prefer to change the tax-filing
process through pre-filled tax returns that require less effort to file a return. 6% of our
respondents have a preference for keeping the status-quo and do not implement any tax
reform.
These results are evidence for heterogeneity in the preferred approach for moving
towards a simplified tax system. While the results from the Taxpayer-A-vs-B part of our
survey and the randomized experiments show that there is a lack of awareness about the
trade-offs behind complexity and simplicity, the results here suggest that, in addition,
there is no consensus w.r.t. the tax simplifying reform to be implemented. Both of these
empirical observations add to an explanation for the puzzle that real-world tax systems are
so complex although the conventional wisdom holds that simplicity is strongly desirable.
We also investigated if the policy-reform preferences are affected by our experimental
intervention, i.e. the first experiment as the second experiment was implemented after
the reform survey question. We do not find any evidence that this is the case. This is
somewhat in line with other recent survey experiments finding that policy preferences are
often relatively inelastic to information treatments (e.g., Kuziemko et al. 2015; Alesina
et al. 2018).
32See Q5 in Appendix for the detailed question design.
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5 Conclusion
The prevailing view in the academic literature and public debate seems to be that most
tax systems are too complex and should be simplified. However, there also are economic
arguments in support of a certain degree of tax complexity and it is puzzling why tax
systems remain highly complex despite the conventional view in favor of more simplifica-
tion. Using new experimental and survey data for a representative sample of the German
population, we shed light on preferences for tax simplification. We find that most people
are indeed in favor of a simpler tax system. However, once we make people aware of the
trade-offs between simplicity and complexity, preferences for simplicity are reduced. For
example, a large share of respondents believes that the tax system should account for dif-
ferent circumstances in living situations (such as costly care of elderly family members).
This suggests that respondents implicitly favor to add complexity to the tax system by
allowing to deduct the associated costs from the tax base.
Our survey also includes two randomized experiments in which we make respondents
aware of the possible consequences of tax simplification. Both randomized experiments
consistently provide evidence that the support for tax simplification is elastic to infor-
mation against tax simplification, while arguments in support of simplification do not
impact preferences for simplification. The results thus suggest that misperceptions are
more relevant in the context of arguments against simplification, which, in turn, is consis-
tent with the observation that arguments in favor of simplicity are more prominent in the
debates and that the general wisdom holds that simplicity is desirable. Overall, we show
that the high support for simpler taxes is to some extent driven by a lack of awareness
about the implications of tax simplification. Individuals apparently frequently express
desires for tax simplification without appreciating the implications of tax simplification.
Overall, our findings suggest that the (policy, academic, and public) debate about
tax simplification potentially benefits from a more nuanced discussion of the pros and
cons of tax simplification. As a result of more nuanced discussion, the matter would not
be dominated by a general wisdom view anymore and instead potentially gain objectivity.
Recent work shows that information deficits among individuals in the context of taxa-
tion can induce governments to implement inefficient tax policy (Boccanfuso and Ferey
2019). More nuanced discussions and better information could also mitigate this source
of inefficiency.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Growth of Tax Expenditures over Time in the US
Notes: US Treasury estimates of tax expenditures, 1986-2013, adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars.
Source: Tax Foundation, Fiscal Fact, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures. Available online: https:
//files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff391.pdf.
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Figure 2: Preferences for Tax Simplification
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“Do you generally think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be simplified?” Respondents
could pick one of the following categories: 1 Absolutely not; ... ; 6 Absolutely; I do not know. The figure
is based on 2,423 non missing observations. The mean answer is 5.16. Source: Own calculations based
on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 3: Perceived Difficulty of Filing a Tax Return
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“How difficult is it for you to fill out your tax return?” Respondents could pick one of the following
categories: 1 Very easy; ... ; 5 Very difficult; I do not know because no taxes are declared in my name;
I do not know because I do not declare taxes myself (rather, my partner or a tax consultant, etc. does
this); I do not know. The figure is based on 2,424 non missing observations. The mean answer for
categories 1 to 5 is 3.41. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 4: Need for Tax Reform
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“Do you generally believe that the income tax system in Germany is in need of reform?” Respondents
could pick one of the following categories: 1 Absolutely not; ... ; 6 Absolutely; I do not know. The figure
is based on 2,423 non missing observations. The mean answer is 5.06. Source: Own calculations based
on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 5: Perceived Distributional Implications of Complexity
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer distribution of income, or
do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more from these deductions and allowances?” Respon-
dents could pick one of the following categories: 1 They contribute to fairer income distribution; ... ; 6
High-income citizens benefit; I do not know. The figure is based on 2,423 non missing observations. The
mean answer is 4.33. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 6: Which Deductions and Allowances are used?
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Which of the following deductions and/or allowances do you usually use when filing your income tax?”
Respondents could pick one of the following categories: Maintenance of two households; Home office;
Commuting allowance; Other job related expenditures; Pension expenses; Education costs; Care relatives;
Child allowance, childcare; Donations; Others [insert text]; No deductions; I do not know. The figure is
based on 2,215 non missing observations. Note shares do not add up to one because respondents could
check multiple items. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 7: Who should pay more taxes? Elderly Care
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“In contrast to Person B, Person A has a poor mother in need of elderly care and has to spend a
considerable amount of her income for the care of her mother. Person A and B have the same gross
income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories
(order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay
higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The figure is based on 2,397 non missing
observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 8: Who should pay more taxes? Donations
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Person A spends a considerable amount of her income on charitable giving. Person B does no such thing.
Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents
could pick one of the following categories (order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should
pay higher taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The
figure is based on 2,398 non missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet
Panel.
50
Figure 9: Who should pay more taxes? Commuting To Work
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work. Person B lives very close to work. Both Person
A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick
one of the following categories (order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher
taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The figure is
based on 2,394 non missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 10: Driven by self interest? Elderly Care
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories by respondents
claiming care deductions. Since only few people claim deductions for elderly care we consider the broader
category of care deductions. Care deductions include deductions for elderly and child care. Question:
“In contrast to Person B, Person A has a poor mother in need of elderly care and has to spend a
considerable amount of her income for the care of her mother. Person A and B have the same gross
income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories
(order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay
higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The left part shows replies for respondents
who do not use the deduction for elderly care. The right part shows replies of respondents who do use
the deduction for elderly care. The figure is based on 2,397 non missing observations. Source: Own
calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 11: Driven by self interest? Donations
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories by respondents
claiming the deduction. Question: “Person A spends a considerable amount of her income on charitable
giving. Person B does no such thing. Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very
similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories (order of answer
categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person
A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The left part shows replies for respondents who do not have
deductible donations. The right part shows replies of respondents who do have deductible donations. The
figure is based on 2,398 non missing observations.Source: Own calculations based on German Internet
Panel.
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Figure 12: Driven by self interest? Commuting
1.82
34.34
63.84
3.10
47.19
49.71
0
20
40
60
P
er
ce
nt
No Commuting Commuting
Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories by respondents
claiming the deduction. Question: “Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work. Person B
lives very close to work. Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all
other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories (order of answer categories was
randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person A and B
should pay equal tax amounts. The left part shows replies for respondents who do not use the deduction
for commuting to work. The right part shows replies of respondents who do use the deduction for
commuting to work. The figure is based on 2,394 non missing observations. Source: Own calculations
based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 13: Which Revenue-Neutral Reform?
14.74
20.78
33.31
17.28
5.76
8.13
0
10
20
30
40
P
er
ce
nt
Flat rate no deduc Flat rate sq deduc
More progr no deduc Prefilled declar.
No change Other
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Which of the following measures to simplify the income tax system would you like the most? Assume
the proposed measures will lead to unchanged tax revenues in each case.” Respondents could pick one of
the following categories: Same rate for all but no deductions and allowances; Same rate for all and same
deductions and allowances as under current system; More progressive tax rates and no deductions and
allowances; Automatic determination of amounts in income tax declaration; No change; Other measure
[insert text]; I do not know. The figure is based on 1,771 non missing observations. Source: Own
calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 14: Preferences for Tax Simplification by Age Categories
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Notes: Average preference for tax simplification by age categories. The outcome variable is the survey-
based preference for tax simplification as described in Section 3. The figure is based on 2,189 non missing
observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 15: Preferences for Tax Simplification by Sex
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Notes: Average preference for tax simplification by sex. The outcome variable is the survey-based
preference for tax simplification as described in Section 3. The figure is based on 2,190 non missing
observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Figure 16: Preferences for Tax Simplification by Perceived Difficulty to File a Return
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Notes: Average preference for tax simplification by perceived difficulty. The outcome variable is the
survey-based preference for tax simplification as described in Section 3. The figure is based on 2,164 non
missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Experiment 1
Redistribution 2424 0.33 0.47 0 1
Avoidance 2424 0.33 0.47 0 1
Control 2424 0.33 0.47 0 1
Experiment 2
Efficiency 2419 0.33 0.47 0 1
Special interest 2419 0.33 0.47 0 1
Control 2419 0.33 0.47 0 1
Demographics
Single households 2463 0.17 0.38 0 1
2 2463 0.46 0.50 0 1
3 2463 0.18 0.38 0 1
4 2463 0.14 0.35 0 1
5+ 2463 0.05 0.22 0 1
Age <=28 2461 0.09 0.29 0 1
Age 29-38 2461 0.15 0.36 0 1
Age 39-48 2461 0.15 0.36 0 1
Age 49-58 2461 0.24 0.43 0 1
Age >=59 2461 0.36 0.48 0 1
Married 2464 0.61 0.49 0 1
Female 2463 0.48 0.50 0 1
Unemployed 2463 0.02 0.13 0 1
Retired 2463 0.23 0.42 0 1
Low education 2401 0.03 0.17 0 1
Low-med education 2401 0.45 0.50 0 1
High-med education 2401 0.23 0.42 0 1
High education 2401 0.30 0.46 0 1
Difficulty in declaring taxes
No difficulty 2381 0.03 0.17 0 1
2 2381 0.11 0.32 0 1
59
3 2381 0.18 0.38 0 1
4 2381 0.20 0.40 0 1
Very difficult 2381 0.12 0.32 0 1
No taxes declared 2381 0.09 0.28 0 1
Not self declared 2381 0.27 0.45 0 1
Household net income
Poor 2464 0.11 0.32 0 1
2 2464 0.19 0.39 0 1
3 2464 0.20 0.40 0 1
4 2464 0.16 0.37 0 1
Rich 2464 0.15 0.36 0 1
No income stated 2464 0.11 0.32 0 1
Not merged 2464 0.07 0.26 0 1
Political orientation
Conservatives 2464 0.38 0.48 0 1
Left-wing 2464 0.47 0.50 0 1
Non partisans 2464 0.08 0.27 0 1
Not merged 2464 0.07 0.26 0 1
Notes: The table depicts the summary statistics for all treatment group dummies and all variables
in our tailored survey block on tax complexity. Variables are defined as follows: experiment 1 and
experiment 2 realizations represent the respective group allocations of respondents in either experiment;
household size comprises single households and household with 2, 3, 4 and 5+ members; age categories
are ≤28, 29-38, 39-48, 49-55 and ≥59; Married equals 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise; Female
equals 1 if respondent is female, 0 otherwise; Unemployed equals 1 if respondent is unemployed,
0 otherwise; Retired equals 1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise; education categories comprise low
(secondary schooling, no job training), low to medium education (upper secondary schooling or finished
job training), high to medium education (upper secondary schooling and finished job training) and
high eduction (tertiary education); household income variables define net monthly household incomes
on a 5-point scale from poor, i.e. 1 (≤1500 Euro), 2 (1500≥x<2500 Euro), 3 (2500≥x<3500 Euro),
4 (3500≥x<4500 Euro) to 5 being rich (≥4500 Euro) as well as a dummy for no answers (No income
stated) and a dummy for those observations which had not been in the GIP wave where the income
question was asked; conservatives equals ≤5 on a 11-scale left-right placement variable, for > 5 left-
wing equals 1. Non partisans did not report a score for the left-rich placement variable and a dummy
for those observations which had not been in the GIP Wave where the political preference question
was asked. Data comes from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 36, except for the following items:
political preferences derived from variable left-right placement (wave 31) as well as household incomes
(wave 31).
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Table 2: Anatomy of tax simplification preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household size 0.030 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.169***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Married -0.054 -0.087 -0.092 -0.093 -0.093
(0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Female -0.128*** -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.140*** -0.138***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Unemployed 0.137 -0.046 -0.038 -0.042 -0.034
(0.199) (0.201) (0.204) (0.204) (0.203)
Retired -0.003 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.030
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Education -0.017 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Difficulty 2 0.690*** 0.686*** 0.682*** 0.675***
(0.212) (0.213) (0.213) (0.214)
Difficulty 3 1.033*** 1.033*** 1.034*** 1.028***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.205)
Difficulty 4 1.375*** 1.373*** 1.370*** 1.364***
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.204)
Very difficult 1.725*** 1.722*** 1.721*** 1.720***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.206)
No taxes declared 1.251*** 1.253*** 1.245*** 1.242***
(0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216)
Taxes not self declared 1.209*** 1.206*** 1.205*** 1.203***
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.203)
Income gr 2 -0.031 -0.030 -0.034
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Income gr 3 -0.018 -0.016 -0.019
(0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
Income gr 4 0.059 0.061 0.056
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
Rich -0.016 -0.011 -0.014
(0.110) (0.111) (0.110)
No income stated 0.036 0.035 0.032
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
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Not merged -0.050 -0.912*** -0.938***
(0.125) (0.124) (0.125)
Conservative -0.039 - 0.039
(0.048) (0.048)
Non partisans 0.028 0.025
(0.103) (0.103)
Not merged 0.850*** 0.863***
(0.119) (0.120)
Redistribution -0.133**
(0.055)
Avoidance -0.029
(0.053)
Constant 4.566*** 3.407*** 3.419*** 3.406*** 3.456***
(0.145) (0.239) (0.246) (0.246) (0.249)
N 2132.000 2109.000 2109.000 2109.000 2109.000
R2 0.046 0.146 0.147 0.148 0.150
Notes: The table presents the determinants of Preferences for Tax Simplicity using OLS regressions
of preferences for tax simplicity on various covariates. Each column (1)-(5) presents the results of one
regression with different sets of covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are defined as follows: experiment 1 and experiment 2 realizations represent
the respective group allocations of respondents in either experiment; household size comprises single
households and household with 2, 3, 4 and 5+ members; age categories are ≤28, 29-38, 39-48, 49-55
and ≥59; Married equals 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if respondent is
female, 0 otherwise; Unemployed equals 1 if respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise; Retired equals
1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise; education categories comprise low (secondary schooling, no
job training), low to medium education (upper secondary schooling or finished job training), high to
medium education (upper secondary schooling and finished job training) and high eduction (tertiary
education); household income variables define net monthly household incomes on a 5-point scale from
poor, i.e. 1 (≤1500 Euro), 2 (1500≥x<2500 Euro), 3 (2500≥x<3500 Euro), 4 (3500≥x<4500 Euro) to 5
being rich (≥4500 Euro) as well as a dummy for no answers (No income stated) and a dummy for those
observations which had not been in the GIP Wave where the income question was asked; conservatives
equals 1 if ≤5 on a 11-scale left-right placement variable, for > 5 left-wing equals 1. Non partisans
did not report a score for the left-right placement variable and a dummy for those observations which
had not been in the GIP Wave where the political preference question was asked. Data comes from
German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 36, except for the following items: political preferences derived
from variable left-right placement (wave 31) as well as household incomes (wave 31).
62
Table 3: Exp 1: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution -0.115** -0.123** -0.133** -0.134** -0.133**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Avoidance -0.042 -0.039 -0.032 -0.032 -0.029
(0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Constant 5.215*** 4.610*** 3.453*** 3.469*** 3.456***
(0.040) (0.149) (0.242) (0.248) (0.249)
N 2190 2132 2109 2109 2109
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on preferences for tax
simplification. This is estimated by OLS regressions of preferences for tax simplification on treatment
dummies. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question: “Do you generally
think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be simplified?” The experimental groups
are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance group. Control is omitted, implying that
the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following information: “In
Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is too complicated because
of many deduction possibilities and allowances.” Participants in the Redistribution group receive the
following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with many deduction
possibilities and allowances has a social-policy and redistributive compensation role. For example, tax
deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances.”
Participants in the Avoidance group receive the following information: “In this context, one argument is
that a tax system with many deduction possibilities and allowances offers more scope for tax avoidance
and tax adjustment. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce one’s own tax burden through
better knowledge of the tax system or through unjustified specifications in the tax return.” Columns
(1)-(5) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty
to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. Robust The
scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Exp 1: Effect on Perceived Distributional Effects of Complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.007
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Avoidance 0.118 0.137 0.157* 0.158* 0.169*
(0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090)
Constant 4.285*** 3.506*** 3.136*** 3.127*** 3.126***
(0.065) (0.215) (0.295) (0.315) (0.314)
N 1998 1946 1931 1931 1931
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on believes about
whether people think that deductions work in favor of the rich. This is estimated by OLS regressions
of beliefs on treatment dummies. The outcome is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question:
‘Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer distribution of income,
or do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more from these deductions and allowances?”
The experimental groups are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance group. Control
is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the
following information: “In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is too
complicated because of many possible deductions and allowances.” Participants in the Redistribution
group receive the following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with
many possible deductions and allowances has an important social-policy role, particularly in relation to
income redistribution. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden of taxpayers
who are disadvantaged by circumstances” Participants in the Avoidance group receive the following
information: “In this context, one argument is that a tax system with many possible deductions and
allowances offers greater opportunity for tax avoidance . For example, when individuals have a better
knowledge of the tax system or make unjustified declarations, they can reduce their tax burden by
taking advantage of certain allowances or deductions.” Columns (1)-(5) differ in the included sets of
covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status,
retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net
household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. The scale of the outcome variable is 1 (add to a
fair income distribution) to 6 (higher incomes benefit). Robust standard errors are in parentheses ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Exp 2: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Economic Efficiency -0.197* -0.216** -0.229** -0.237** -0.240**
(0.109) (0.109) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Special Interest -0.064 -0.062 -0.055 -0.068 -0.067
(0.097) (0.097) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095)
Constant 5.084*** 4.588*** 3.928*** 3.993*** 3.960***
(0.066) (0.160) (0.222) (0.232) (0.232)
N 2187 2134 2114 2114 2114
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions of the second exper-
iment on preferences for tax simplification. This is estimated by OLS regressions of preferences for
tax simplification on treatment dummies and a full set of interactions of the treatment groups of the
first and second experiment. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question:
“ Now that we have dealt extensively with various aspects of the German tax system in this survey,
we would like to ask again: do you generally believe that the income tax system should be simplified
in Germany?” The experimental groups are: Control group, Economic efficiency group and Special
interest group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All par-
ticipants receive the following information: “We would like to once again address the ongoing debate
concerning whether the income tax system is too complicated due to the many possible deductions and
allowances.” Participants in the Economic efficiency group receive the following information: “One
argument that is often used against tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that
a tax system with many deductions and allowances provides better opportunities to tax individuals
in accordance with their ability to pay and is therefore economically more efficient.” Participants in
the Special interest group receive the following information: “One argument that is often used against
tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions
and allowances offers special interest groups greater opportunity for obtaining exemptions ” Columns
(1)-(5) all include a full set of interactions of the treatment groups of the first and second experiment,
they differ in the additionally included sets of covariates. (1): no additional covariates, (2): gender,
age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2)
plus perceived difficulty to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political
preferences. The scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Balancing Tests First Experiment
Variable Redistribution Avoidance Control
Gender: Reference category Male
Sex 0.022 -0.029 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Marital status: Reference category: Not married
Married 0.013 0.029 -0.036*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Unemployed: Reference category: Employed
Unemployed -0.011 -0.061 0.063
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Retirement status: Reference category: Not retired
Retired 0.042* 0.016 -0.042*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Household size:
HH-size -0.007 0.012 -0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education:
Education -0.010 -0.011 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Household net income: Reference category poor
2 -0.006 0.031 -0.016
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
3 -0.030 0.065* -0.032
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
4 -0.032 0.047 -0.010
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Rich -0.020 0.041 -0.014
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(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
No income stated -0.033 0.053 -0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Age category:
Age 0.017** -0.004 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Political orientation: Reference category: Left-wing
Conservative -0.022 -0.056*** -0.033
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Non partisans -0.051 -0.003 0.050
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Difficulty in declaring taxes: Reference category: No difficulty
2 0.022 0.099 -0.022
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
3 -0.066 0.116* -0.050
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
4 -0.059 0.064 -0.005
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Very difficult -0.012 0.020 -0.009
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
No taxes declared -0.055 0.086 -0.031
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Taxes not self declared -0.030 0.089 -0.059
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Notes: Randomization checks for the first experiment. The table shows the coefficients and standard
errors (in parentheses) from a series of regressions of the form: yi = βCovariatei+i. Where Covariatei
is the respective covariate listed above. In Column (1) yi equals 1 if participant i is in the redistribution
group and 0 otherwise. In Column (2),yi equals 1 if participant i is in the avoidance group and 0
otherwise. In Column (3), yi equals 1 if participant i is in the control group and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Balancing Tests Second Experiment
Variable Economic efficency Special interest Control
Gender. Reference category Male
Sex -0.025 0.021 -0.001
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Marital status: Reference category: Not married
Married -0.038 0.032 0.012
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Unemployed: Reference category: Employed
Unemployed 0.302** -0.165 -0.134
(0.118) (0.120) (0.118)
Retirement status: Reference category: Not retired
Retired 0.031 -0.002 -0.026
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Household size:
HH-size -0.01 0.009 -0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Education:
Education -0.018 0.011 0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Household net income: Reference category poor
2 -0.069 0.027 0.043
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
3 -0.012 -0.008 0.020
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
4 -0.138** 0.063 0.075
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
Rich -0.092 -0.004 0.088
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
No income stated -0.014 0.090 -0.086
(0.068) (0.069) (0.067)
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Age category:
Age -0.004 0.014 -0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Political orientation: Reference category: Left-wing
Conservative -0.007 -0.019 0.026
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Non partisans 0.141** -0.160*** 0.022
(0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
Difficulty in declaring taxes: Reference category: No difficulty
2 -0.025 -0.009 -0.125
(0.104) (0.106) (0.103)
3 0.117 0.021 -0.145
(0.101) (0.102) (0.100)
4 0.135 0.050 -0.191*
(0.099) (0.101) (0.098)
Very difficult 0.206** -0.091 -0.115
(0.104) (0.106) (0.103)
No taxes declared 0.175 0.021 -0.197*
(0.108) (0.110) (0.107)
Taxes not self declared 0.116 0.012 -0.128
(0.098) (0.100) (0.097)
Notes: Randomization checks for the second experiment. The table shows the coefficients and standard
errors (in parentheses) from a series of regressions of the form: yi = βCovariatei+i. Where Covariatei
is the respective covariate listed above. Sample restricted to those participants who were in the control
group in the first experiment. In Column (1) yi equals 1 if participant i is in the economic efficency
group and 0 otherwise. In Column (2),yi equals 1 if participant i is in the special interest group and 0
otherwise. In Column (3), yi equals 1 if participant i is in the control group and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Exp 1: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification. Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution -0.109* -0.123** -0.144** -0.146** -0.144**
(0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Avoidance -0.041 -0.038 -0.024 -0.024 -0.019
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Constant -0.120*** 0.482*** 1.537*** 1.499*** 1.516***
(0.043) (0.150) (0.216) (0.227) (0.228)
N 2190 2132 2109 2109 2109
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on preferences for
tax simplification. Estimated by an ordered probit regressions of preferences for tax simplification on
treatment dummies. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question: “Do you
generally think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be simplified?” The experimental
groups are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance group. Control is omitted, implying
that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following information:
“In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is too complicated because
of many deduction possibilities and allowances.” Participants in the Redistribution group receive the
following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with many deduction
possibilities and allowances has a social-policy and redistributive compensation role. For example, tax
deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances.”
Participants in the Avoidance group receive the following information: “In this context, one argument is
that a tax system with many deduction possibilities and allowances offers more scope for tax avoidance
and tax adjustment. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce one’s own tax burden through
better knowledge of the tax system or through unjustified specifications in the tax return.” Columns
(1)-(5) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty
to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. Robust The
scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Exp 1: Effect on Distributional Effects of Complexity. Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution -0.004 -0.007 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Avoidance 0.079 0.092 0.109* 0.110* 0.120**
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Constant 0.463*** 0.976*** 1.216*** 1.229*** 1.238***
(0.046) (0.142) (0.195) (0.211) (0.211)
N 1998 1946 1931 1931 1931
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on beliefs about
whether people think that deductions work in favor of the rich. Estimated by an ordered probit
Regressions of believes on treatment dummies. The outcome is measured on a 6 point scale based
on the question: ‘Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer dis-
tribution of income, or do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more from these deductions
and allowances?” The experimental groups are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance
group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants
receive the following information: “In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income
tax system is too complicated because of many possible deductions and allowances.” Participants
in the Redistribution group receive the following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued
that a tax system with many possible deductions and allowances has an important social-policy role,
particularly in relation to income redistribution. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce
the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances” Participants in the Avoidance
group receive the following information: “In this context, one argument is that a tax system with
many possible deductions and allowances offers greater opportunity for tax avoidance . For example,
when individuals have a better knowledge of the tax system or make unjustified declarations, they can
reduce their tax burden by taking advantage of certain allowances or deductions.” Columns (1)-(5)
differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household
size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty to declare
taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. Robust The scale of the
outcome variable 1 (add to a fair income distribution) to 6 (higher incomes benefit). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Exp 2: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification. Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Economic Efficiency -0.153 -0.182* -0.210** -0.220** -0.224**
(0.102) (0.105) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Special Interest -0.041 -0.037 -0.023 -0.038 -0.035
(0.096) (0.098) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Constant 0.048 0.527*** 1.145*** 1.066*** 1.107***
(0.068) (0.155) (0.205) (0.218) (0.219)
N 2187 2134 2114 2114 2114
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions of the second experi-
ment on preferences for tax simplification. Estimated by an ordered probit regressions of preferences
for tax simplification on treatment dummies and a full set of interactions of the treatment groups of the
first and second experiment. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question:
“Now that we have dealt extensively with various aspects of the German tax system in this survey,
we would like to ask again: do you generally believe that the income tax system should be simplified
in Germany?” The experimental groups are: Control group, Economic efficiency group and Special
interest group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All par-
ticipants receive the following information: “We would like to once again address the ongoing debate
concerning whether the income tax system is too complicated due to the many possible deductions and
allowances.” Participants in the Economic efficiency group receive the following information: “One
argument that is often used against tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that
a tax system with many deductions and allowances provides better opportunities to tax individuals
in accordance with their ability to pay and is therefore economically more efficient.” Participants in
the Special interest group receive the following information: “One argument that is often used against
tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions
and allowances offers special interest groups greater opportunity for obtaining exemptions ” Columns
(1)-(5) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty
to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. The scale of
the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Illustration of treatment conditions
First experiment
Figure 17: Redistribution treatment
Figure 18: Avoidance treatment
Second experiment
Figure 19: Economic efficiency treatment
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Figure 20: Special interest group treatment
Detailed Questionnaire
This appendix section presents the translated survey questions including reply categories.
The order of presentation and the numbering of the question corresponds with the de-
scription of the survey structure in section 3.2.
• Introduction: In the following, we would like to ask you some questions about
the tax system in Germany. We will focus in particular on rules surrounding the
income tax and whether they are complicated or easy to understand. Whether a tax
system is generally complicated or easy to understand depends in particular on the
number of possible deductions and allowances.
• Q1: How difficult is it for you to fill out your tax return?
1 Very easy ;...; 5 Very difficult ; I do not know because no taxes are declared in my
name; I do not know because I do not declare taxes myself (rather, my partner or
a tax consultant, etc. does this); I do not know
• Randomized Experiment 1: See body of the text (section 3.3) and section 5
above.
• Q2: Do you generally think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be
simplified?
1 Absolutely not ;...; 6 Absolutely ; I do not know
• Q3: Do you generally believe that the income tax system in Germany is in need of
reform?
1 Absolutely not ;...; 6 Absolutely ; I do not know
• Q4: Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer
distribution of income, or do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more
from these deductions and allowances?
1 They contribute to fairer income distribution;...; 6 High-income citizens benefit ;
I do not know
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• Q5: Which of the following measures to simplify the income tax system would you
like the most? Assume the proposed measures will lead to unchanged tax revenues
in each case.
Same rate for all but no deductions and allowances ; Same rate for all and same
deductions and allowances as under current system; More progressive tax rates and
no deductions and allowances ; Automatic determination of amounts in income tax
declaration; No change; Other measure [insert text] ; I do not know
• Introduction for Q6-8 Imagine two persons, A and B. Which person do you think
should pay more taxes in the following situation?
• Q6: In contrast to Person B, Person A has a poor mother in need of elderly care
and has to spend a considerable amount of her income for the care of her mother.
Person A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all other
respects. (randomize order of answer categories)
Person A should pay higher taxes ; Person B should pay higher taxes ; Person A and
B should pay equal tax amounts
• Q7: Person A spends a considerable amount of her income on charitable giving.
Person B does no such thing. Both Person A and B have the same gross income
and are very similar in all other respects. (randomize order of answer categories)
Person A should pay higher taxes ; Person B should pay higher taxes ; Person A and
B should pay equal tax amounts
• Q8: Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work. Person B lives very
close to work. Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very
similar in all other respects.(randomize order of answer categories)
Person A should pay higher taxes ; Person B should pay higher taxes ; Person A and
B should pay equal tax amounts
• Randomized Experiment 2: See body of the text (section 3.3) and section 5
above.
• Q9: Now that we have dealt extensively with various aspects of the German tax
system in this survey, we would like to ask again: do you generally believe that the
income tax system should be simplified in Germany?
1 Absolutely not ;...; 6 Absolutely ; I do not know
• Q10: Which of the following deductions and/or allowances do you usually use when
filing your income tax?
Maintenance of two households ; Home office; Commuting allowance; Other job
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related expenditures ; Pension expenses ; Education costs ; Care relatives ; Child al-
lowance, childcare; Donations ; Others [insert text] ; No deductions ; I do not know
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